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Abstract
Incentive contracts and monitoring by boards o f directors and blockholders are 
alternative internal mechanisms to ensure that managers act in the interests of 
shareholders. Most prior research on compensation and performance ignores 
endogeneity among board, ownership and compensation structure (mix o f  pay) variables. 
Ignoring the endogeneity leads to inconsistent parameter estimates. I address the 
endogeneity problem by using a simultaneous equations model. The three equations in 
the system are mix o f pay, compensation and performance.
The results are consistent with efficient contracting. Mix o f pay depends on 
characteristics o f the firm and alternative governance mechanisms. The relation between 
stockholders and debtholders affects the relation between managers and stockholders. 
Financial leverage has a significant effect on mix o f pay.
Compensation and performance equations show that mix o f pay is endogenous 
and belongs in both equations as an explanatory variable. Mix of pay is significantly 
positive in the compensation equation, consistent with the prediction that higher 
incentive based compensation leads to higher compensation risk and hence higher 
compensation. Neither mix o f pay nor the board and ownership variables is significant in 
the performance equation, suggesting that firms choose optimal combinations of 
governance mechanisms. The direct effect o f regulation on compensation reported in 
prior studies is spurious. The evidence provided shows that this effect is caused by 
omitting mix of pay from the compensation equation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1. Introduction
Agency relations between managers and stockholders are widely researched in 
accounting, economics and finance. Many studies examine the effectiveness of incentive 
mechanisms by studying the relations among mix of pay, compensation, performance, 
management turnover, ownership, and board structure. 1
Empirical investigations into the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms contain 
contradictory findings. Switches in signs o f variables and/or changes in their significance 
are commonly observed. Interpretations o f the results also conflict in some cases. For 
example, compensation studies that find a positive association between percentage of 
outside directors on the board and compensation interpret their finding as indicating 
failure o f boards dominated by outsiders. On the other hand, other studies that find a 
positive price reaction to the appointment of outside board members, or a positive 
association between percentage o f outside board members and performance, interpret 
their results as consistent with the effectiveness of boards dominated by outside 
directors. In reality, either boards are effective or not. The same board cannot be 
effective and ineffective at the same time.
The logical implications o f some prior studies are bothersome. Arguments such 
as, high CEO ownership is better than low CEO ownership, or having more insiders on
1 Mix of pay is used to refer to compensation structure. It is defined as non-salary (i.e., total 
compensation - salary) divided by total compensation, expressed as a percentage. Incentive based 
compensation and incentive contracts are interchangeably used with mix of pay.
1
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the board is better than having more outsiders on the board because they lead to low 
compensation and/or high performance are problematic for two reasons.
First, such reasoning suggests that there is a unique ownership, board structure 
and incentive contract that is suitable to all firms. This precludes substitution across 
different mechanisms as a way to resolve agency conflicts. If ownership, governance and 
compensation mechanisms are substitutes or complements, firms will choose a mix o f 
mechanisms that equates marginal costs and marginal benefits across mechanisms. These 
tradeoffs are likely to vary with firms’ circumstances. In this case, there is no unique 
correct package o f mechanisms; different combinations of the mechanisms are optimal 
for different firms. For example, it might be optimal for a small firm with higher 
percentage o f inside ownership to opt for lower percentage o f outside directors and less 
use of incentive contracts. A large firm with low inside ownership and a larger 
percentage of outside directors might use more incentive based compensation. 
Empirically, the key question is, what is the cross sectional relation between margins and 
mechanisms?
Second, such conclusions are inconsistent with the notions o f market efficiency 
and efficient contracting. In an informationally efficient market, any deviations from the 
optimal governance structure or any move towards it should be quickly reflected in price 
at the time the change becomes known. If so, there should not be any relation between 
the known governance structure and subsequent firm performance. Most o f the recent 
findings in the empirical research, however, contradict this. For example, Core et al. 
(1999) report a negative association between predicted excess compensation and future
2
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performance (one, three and five years return).2 This implies that the market takes three 
to five years to impound information about observable variables, such as board and 
ownership structure, in price. This is inconsistent with market efficiency.
The main goal o f this paper is to explain the inconsistencies in the literature. The 
theory in section two incorporates the agency relation o f  stockholders with debtholders 
into the analysis, and develops implications of efficient contracting that have been largely 
ignored in empirical work. An important implication o f efficient contracting is that all 
agency relations, ownership, and governance mechanisms within the firm should be 
treated jointly. The study addresses this jointness directly using simultaneous estimation.
Agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Holmstrom (1979), suggests mix o f 
pay as one o f the mechanisms to resolve the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders. The theory also indicates that mix of pay imposes compensation risk on 
risk averse managers and hence leads to higher expected compensation. Mix of pay 
therefore belongs in both the compensation and performance equations. Most prior 
research that examines the effect of the governance system of corporations does not 
include mix of pay in the compensation and performance equations; there is a correlated 
omitted variable.
Papers by Core et al. (1999) and Mehran (1995) provide cogent illustrations o f 
the source o f the conflicting results. These papers examine the effect of including mix of
2 Predicted excess compensation is calculated by multiplying the estimated coefficients for board and 
ownership characteristics variables by their respective values at the end of period for which the 
compensation equation is estimated.
3
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pay in a compensation and performance equation respectively. Core et al. (1999) find 
that mix o f pay and compensation are significantly positively related. They interpret this 
as evidence o f governance failure. However, this finding is also consistent with efficient 
contracting predictions that a risky pay package leads to higher compensation.
Mehran (1995) documents a significantly positive effect o f mix o f pay on 
performance. He interprets this as supporting the incentive alignment role o f mix of pay. 
However, this should not lead to conclusions that low mix of pay is undesirable. Having 
low mix o f pay may be optimal for firms that have access to other mechanisms to resolve 
the agency conflict. What matters is not having more or less o f one mechanism, but 
having an optimal mix o f mechanisms.
While addressing the correlated omitted variables problem by including mix of 
pay in the compensation and performance equations, the Mehran (1995) and Core et al. 
(1999) studies, however, create endogeneity problems. To illustrate further, consider 
Core et al. (1999) in more detail. They run two set o f equations. The first equation is the 
mix of pay equation. Mix of pay is a function o f some economic determinants, ownership 
and board variables. That is, Mixofpay = f(x, y, z ) , where x is a vector o f economic
determinant variables, such as size, growth and volatility; y is a vector of ownership 
variables, such as CEO ownership, and the presence o f a five percent non-CEO insider; z 
is a vector o f board variables, such as percentage of inside directors, and board size. The 
second equation is the compensation equation that relates compensation to its economic
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
determinants, ownership and board variables and mix of pay. That is, 
Compensation = g(x ,y ,z, f(x,y, z)) and all vectors are as defined above.
Consider replacing mix of pay by the sum of its estimated component and the 
error term from the mix of pay equation. Substituting f(x ,y ,z) + e into the
compensation equation provides Compensation = g(x, y, z, f(x, y, z) + s ) . If z  is
correlated with compensation, then there is an endogeneity problem and ordinary least 
squares estimates are biased and inconsistent.
To address endogeneity, a system of equations is estimated using a sample o f 195 
S&P 500 firms for 1993. The major findings are: (1) The use o f mix of pay varies across 
firms due to differences in economic characteristics, ownership and board structures. 
Specifically, large firms and firms with older CEOs tend to use mix of pay more. Firms 
with higher leverage and CEO ownership tend to use incentive compensation less. (2) 
Firms use governance mechanisms in a manner that is consistent with efficient 
contracting. In compensation and performance equations that control for economic 
determinants o f compensation and performance, and include mix of pay as an 
explanatory variable, none of the governance variables except board size are found to be 
significant. The significant negative effect o f board size on performance is a puzzle.
The remainder o f the paper is organized as follows: The next section develops 
the efficient contracting theory that guides the remainder o f the paper. That section 
focuses on fairly general concepts and abstracts from specific measurement details. The 
theory is used in section three to examine the prior empirical literature to highlight
5
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inconsistencies and puzzles. Section four extends the theory to address measurement 
issues and provide sign predictions for coefficients. Section four also discusses sample 
selection and data description. The primary results are in section five, and sensitivity 
analyses are in section six. The final section provides a summary and conclusions.
6
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2. Implications of Efficient Contracting for Agency Relations
There are two views of agency relations that are not mutually exclusive. The first 
is that managers behave opportunistically because there are no effective mechanisms to 
constrain their behavior. The second is that competitive pressures induce managers to 
maximize the value o f the firm. This view reflects economic Darwinism; economic 
survival requires discovering efficient ways to manage the firm This approach is known 
as efficient contracting. Efficient contracting assumes that managers, shareholders, the 
board o f directors and bondholders have incentives to maximize value, which requires 
equating the marginal costs and marginal benefits o f alternative mechanisms to mitigate 
agency problems.
Theories based on efficiency imply strong testable restrictions on agency relations 
associated with the firm. Theories based on opportunism are less restrictive, since there 
are myriad ways that opportunism can occur. While these two views of the firm are not 
mutually exclusive, it is useful to think of them as extremes. The main emphasis o f this 
section is on efficiency. The evaluation o f prior studies in section three leads naturally to 
discussions o f  opportunism, since most empirical studies present mixtures o f efficiency 
and opportunism hypotheses.
Opportunism stems from the separation o f  management from control that 
characterizes modem corporations. Such separation caused economists to question the 
viability o f the classical economics notion o f profit (value) maximization as the goal o f 
firms. Some economists (for e.g., Berle and Means (1932)) argue that profit
7
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maximization as the goal o f  firms is not viable under separation because (i) self interest 
driven managers may not choose actions compatible with the interests o f owners 
(shareholders) and (ii) atomistic shareholders have neither the incentive nor the ability to 
discipline managers (i.e., to make managers act in their (shareholders’) interest). This is 
referred to as managerial opportunism or the self-serving management view o f the firm.
There is confusing use of the term opportunism in the literature. Christie and 
Zimmerman (1994) point out that one implication o f efficient contracting is that the only 
observable opportunism is ex post unexpected opportunism. Subject to contracting 
costs, opportunism expected ex ante is constrained by contracts. The empirical studies 
evaluated in section three do not make this distinction.
As an extreme, viability of opportunism as a theory of the firm requires the 
absence o f mechanisms and incentives to mitigate agency problems. However, such 
mechanisms exist and there are incentives to use them to maximize value. Competition in 
the labor market, Fama (1980); separation o f decision management from decision 
control, (i.e., monitoring by board of directors, Fama and Jensen (1983)); concentrated 
share ownership, Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); competition 
in the product market, Hart (1983); incentive contracts, Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Holmstrom (1979); and corporate control, Jensen and Ruback (1983), are proposed as 
ways to resolve the agency problem between managers and shareholders.
The remainder o f this section addresses the use o f capital structure, ownership, 
compensation and corporate governance mechanisms to alleviate agency problems and 
maximize value. While the primary emphasis in this section is on efficiency, it is
8
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important to understand that carrying any mechanism to mitigate agency costs to an 
extreme can generate other agency problems. Each contractual mechanism has both 
costs and benefits.
Debtholders have incentives to monitor managers’ compliance with debt 
covenants. If covenants are value increasing, monitoring by debtholders helps in 
mitigating the agency problem between managers and shareholders. Debt, however, 
creates another agency problem between shareholders and debtholders. Compensation 
contracts are used as a precomitment device to minimize the agency cost o f debt and 
hence leverage influences the extent to which mix o f  pay is used by firms.
Ownership affects incentives to create value, and managers o f corporations rarely 
have zero ownership. Non trivial ownership by managers means that managers are not 
indifferent to firm value maximization. High managerial ownership provides an incentive 
to maximize firm value. However, increased managerial ownership has costs. First, high 
managerial ownership may lead to entrenchment if managers with higher ownership
levels wield more bargaining power with the board. ^  Second, managers have limited 
wealth and hence there is a limit to the percentage o f the firm they can own. Moreover, 
managers also demand diversification. With their human capital invested in a firm, 
investing a large proportion of their financial capital in the same firm leads managers to 
be undiversified. This suggests that firms need to weigh the marginal costs and benefits 
of increased managerial ownership.
3 See Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) for a detailed discussion on the impact of CEO power on the 
independence and hence effectiveness of the board.
9
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Tying CEO compensation to firm performance is another way to motivate 
managers to act in the interest of shareholders. Increasing the proportion of performance 
related compensation to total compensation, changing the mix of pay, increases 
incentives to maximize value. However, increasing the mix o f pay imposes compensation 
risk on risk averse managers and hence may lead to higher expected compensation. Firms 
need to balance the incentive alignment benefits of increasing mix of pay against the cost 
of inefficient risk sharing that it imposes.
Monitoring by large shareholders is yet another way to resolve the agency 
problem. Characterizing corporations as being owned by atomistic shareholders, who 
have little incentive to expend resources to monitor management (a free rider problem) is 
incomplete. There are shareholders with high level(s) o f ownership who have incentives 
to monitor managers whether they are members of the board or not, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986). The large shareholders are usually referred to as blockholders (shareholders with 
5% or more ownership). Such large shareholders have the incentive to learn more about 
the firms’ operations and, either the optimal set of actions managers should take, or the 
state of the world; see section 2.1. They also have more bargaining power than atomistic 
shareholders.
Although blockholders have an incentive to actively monitor managers and 
facilitate wealth creation, they also have an incentive to take actions that will enrich 
themselves at the expense o f other shareholders (wealth distribution). Furst and Kang 
(1998) document a positive (negative) relationship between ownership by the largest 
non-CEO shareholder and expected operating performance (market value). The limited
10
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wealth blockholders have at their disposal, and the demand for portfolio diversification, 
sets the upper limit for the concentration o f ownership. These arguments imply that firms 
should once again choose the optimal level o f  ownership concentration by equalizing 
marginal costs and marginal benefits.
Monitoring by the board of directors is another way firms can mitigate the 
agency conflict between managers and shareholders. The board o f directors is at the 
center o f the governance system of corporations. The board is the shareholders’ agent in 
negotiations with the CEO and in the monitoring of the CEO. The board is accountable 
to shareholders and, at least in principle, shareholders retain the right to appoint and fire 
board members. In practice, however, the CEO, whose activities the board is expected to 
monitor, plays a major role in the appointment and termination o f board members. This 
casts doubt on the independence of the board and its ability to carry out its duties as 
monitor of the CEO. Board members as agents o f shareholders, like any other self- 
interest driven agents, may also have incentives to pursue goals other than shareholder 
value maximization. Who will monitor the monitors?
There are, however, contractual and market mechanisms that ensure boards 
behave in the interests o f  shareholders. Board members’ concern for their reputation as 
decision controllers, competition in the market for directors, ownership interest o f board 
members, and incentive contracts that tie board members remuneration to firm 
performance help ensure that the board acts towards value maximization. Competition in 
the product market, the market for corporate control, and investors ability to price
1 1
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protect themselves also strengthen boards’ motivation to act in the interests o f 
shareholders.
In summary, the efficient contracting view contends that there are contractual, 
institutional, and market mechanisms that align the interests o f  managers with those o f 
shareholders. Efficient contracting suggests that firms choose optimal combinations o f 
the internal mechanisms by equating margins. These margins depend on firms’ 
circumstances. That is, firms’ underlying economic characteristics drive the relative costs 
and benefits o f the different control mechanisms. The variations we observe in the use o f 
the different mechanisms are, therefore, reflections o f differences in firms’ economic 
circumstances.
Deviations from the optimal mix will trigger actions from one or more o f  the 
external (market) mechanisms: labor market, product market or corporate control 
market. Therefore, deviations from an optimum cannot persist in the long run. Economic 
Darwinism works and only optimal mixes o f the internal mechanisms survive. There is no 
unique mix o f pay, ownership or board structure that is suitable to all firms.
In the remainder o f this section, I discuss the implications of efficient contracting 
for (1) the relationship among the three internal mechanisms; mix of pay, ownership and 
board structures; (2) the relationship between compensation and the internal 
mechanisms; and (3) the relationship between performance and the internal mechanisms.
12
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2.1. Mix of pay, board structure and ownership structure
Agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Holmstrom (1979) suggests that 
incentive contracts are one way of mitigating the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders. Incentive contracts are generally o f  the form w = f ( x ) , where w is the 
amount o f incentive based compensation and x is the level o f output measure 
(accounting or market) to which it is related. The level o f output depends on the actions 
the CEO takes and the state of nature, i.e., x  = g(a(-*),s ) . where s is the state o f nature, 
and a(s) is the actions taken by the CEO conditional on the state of nature.
There are two conditions under which a firm can use a forcing contract that pays 
the CEO a fixed amount when the desired action (or output) is observed and penalizes 
him severely for any deviations from it. The first is when managerial actions are 
observable and the optimal level of action is known. The second is when there is no 
environmental uncertainty, i.e., there is a one to one mapping between a(s) and x,  and 
the level of optimal action is known. Whenever these two conditions are not present, 
firms resort to contracts that relate compensation to an output measure desired by 
shareholders such as stock prices, and any other measure of performance that may be 
indicative o f managerial action such as accounting returns.
The extent to which firms use mix o f pay (incentive contracts) to align the 
interests of managers with those of shareholders, therefore, depends on whether 
managerial actions are observable, whether the optimal action is known, and the level o f 
uncertainty o f the environment in which the firm operates. I refer to these conditions as
13
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monitoring difficulty here after. Other things being equal, firms with high monitoring 
difficulty tend to use more mix of pay (incentive compensation) to mitigate the adverse 
effect o f the agency problem. Monitoring difficulty is a characteristic o f the firm’s 
investment opportunity set (IOS). Since monitoring difficulty is not observable, I use 
IOS variables that drive monitoring difficulty as explanatory variables in the mix o f pay 
equation. Measurement o f the IOS variables is discussed in section four.
John and John (1993) and John and Senbet (1998) argue that management 
compensation in a levered firm serves not only as a way o f aligning the interests of 
managers and shareholders, but also as a precommitment device to minimize the agency 
cost of debt. The shareholder/debtholder conflict arises because the shareholders hold 
the decision rights, and act to maximize the value o f the equity rather than the value of 
the firm. Part o f the manager/shareholder conflict arises because managers have a fixed 
claim on the firm through their salary. This fixed claim induces managers to behave like 
bondholders; see Smith and Watts (1992). Increasing managers’ mix o f pay moves them 
to behave more like shareholders. If, by adjusting the mix of pay, we can induce 
managers to maximize the value of the firm instead o f the value of the equity, we can 
simultaneously address the shareholder/manager and the shareholder/debtholder 
conflicts. As the relative amount debt in the capital structure increases, we want 
managers to behave more like debtholders, and mix of pay must decline.
A secondary effect of debt is that, when covenants exist, debtholders have 
incentives to monitor managers’ compliance with those contracts. Further, the incentive 
to monitor compliance with covenants increases with leverage. If the covenants increase
14
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value, such direct monitoring is a substitute for increasing mix of pay. Both debt 
arguments imply that mix of pay should decline with leverage.
Monitoring difficulty and capital structure are not the only factors that determine 
the choice o f mix o f pay, however. Factors that reduce or increase the severity o f the 
agency problem between managers and shareholders, and mechanisms that offer 
alternative ways o f mitigating the agency problem also affect the choice. A CEO 
approaching retirement age is an example o f  a condition that exacerbates the agency 
problem. As the CEO approaches retirement, the horizon problem becomes more severe 
and the threat o f dismissal as a way for disciplining CEOs becomes ineffective. Following 
Jensen and Murphy (1990), I include a variable that proxies for a CEO’s approaching 
retirement age (CEOOLD) in the mix o f pay equation.
CEO ownership can reduce the severity o f  the agency problem between managers 
and shareholders. Also, monitoring by large shareholders and the board o f  directors help 
align the interests o f CEOs with those of shareholders. Board and ownership variables 
are included in the mix o f pay equation because they are alternative ways o f  encouraging 
CEOs to act in the interests of shareholders.
Therefore, the mix of pay equation is:
Mix o f pay = f  (IOS, leverage, CEOOLD, board, ownership). (2.1)
2.2. Compensation, board structure and ownership structure
In a competitive labor market, demand and supply determine the equilibrium level 
o f CEO compensation. Firms’ demand for high quality management, i.e., more skilled
15
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and experienced management, other things being equal, will lead to higher expected 
CEO compensation. The demand for high quality management is driven by the firm’s
IOS .4 IOS variables (discussed in section four) are, therefore, included in the 
compensation equation.
Consistent with the proposals o f agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Holmstrom (1979) and others, I include firm performance measures in the compensation 
equation. 1 include both accounting and market measures o f performance that are 
discussed in detail in section four.^ Compensation is expected to increase with 
performance.
Increasing the mix o f pay shifts risk to the risk averse managers. Risk averse 
managers would be willing to bear the additional risk if and only if they are compensated 
for it. Therefore, expected compensation will tend to be higher in firms that put more 
weight on incentive compensation. This suggests that mix o f  pay should be included as 
an explanatory variable in the compensation equation.
Individual characteristics o f CEOs, such as educational level and tenure (i.e., 
supply side factors) may also have an effect on compensation. In this paper the focus is 
on the moral hazard problem. Following Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999), I assume 
that firms in equilibrium will not reward unnecessary human capital investment by CEOs.
4 See Core Holthausen and Larcker (1999), Smith and Watts (1992), and Gaver and Gaver (1993) for 
elaborated discussions.
5 See Lambert and Larcker (1987), Paul (1992), Sloan (1993) and others for a detailed discussion on 
the role of accounting numbers in compensation contracts.
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Firms are willing to pay only for the skill and experience the job requires as reflected in 
the demand side variables mentioned above. Therefore, I do not include individual CEO 
characteristics variables in the model.
Efficient contracting suggests that no firm will, in equilibrium, pay CEOs over 
and above the compensation level implied by economic determinants. Board and 
ownership variables only affect compensation through their effect on the choice o f the 
mix of pay. This implies that once one controls for mix o f  pay, one should not find any 
relation between compensation and the board and ownership variables. However, 
opportunism theories predict that board and ownership variables affect compensation, 
even after controlling for mix o f pay and other economic determinants. To test this 
opportunism hypothesis, the ownership and board structure variables are included in the 
compensation equation. The second equation in the structural model is:
Compensation = f  (IOS, mix of pay, performance, board, ownership). (2.2)
2.3. Performance, board structure and ownership structure
Efficient contracting theories argue that, conditional on their circumstances, firms 
choose optimal mixes o f governance mechanisms to align the interests of managers with 
those o f shareholders. If deviations from value maximizing choices are public knowledge, 
market efficiency implies that movement away from the optimal set of control 
mechanisms affects prices quickly. Therefore, known failures o f control mechanisms 
cannot affect future performance. That is, while different ownership and board structures 
suit different firms, efficiency implies that there is not a systematic association between 
ownership and board structures known today and future performance.
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Returns (performance) can be written as the sum of expected and unexpected 
returns, n = E(n) + u;. If the market is semi-strong form efficient, and board structure, 
ownership and mix of pay are known at the beginning of the year, then neither expected 
nor unexpected returns depend on board, ownership or mix variables. The single factor 
asset pricing model implies that expected return (performance) depends on systematic 
risk (beta). However, recent studies suggest that performance also depends on other 
factors. For example, Fama and French (1992) claim that at least two other variables, 
size and book to market equity, are important determinants o f performance.
Mehran (1995) and Core et al. (1999) use variables that are correlated with 
expected returns to explain performance. They also include board, ownership and mix of 
pay in the performance equation to test if these variables affect performance as claimed 
by the managerial opportunism theory. The performance equation is
Performance = f  (expected return, unexpected return, board, ownership, mix o f pay). (2.3)
2.4. Summary of structural equations
To summarize, the three equation structural model is 
Mix o f pay = f  (IOS, leverage, CEOOLD, board, ownership), (2.1)
Compensation = f  (IOS, mix of pay, performance, board, ownership), (2.2)
Performance = f  (expected return, unexpected return, board, ownership, mix o f pay). (2.3)
The optimal mix o f pay a firm chooses depends on the IOS, leverage, whether the 
CEO is close to retirement, and the firm’s choice o f ownership and board structures.
18
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There is a relationship (substitution or complementarity) among the internal governance 
mechanisms. That is, board structure and ownership affect mix of pay.
The IOS affects compensation because large firms, growth firms, and risky firms 
require managers with different skills from firms without these characteristics. Mix of 
pay affects CEO compensation because the mix o f pay chosen influences the magnitude 
of the compensation risk imposed on the CEO. Under efficient contracting, board and 
ownership structures affect compensation only through their effect on mix o f pay. Given 
that each firm chooses an optimal mix of the internal mechanisms, a cross sectional 
regression o f compensation on board structure and ownership that controls for mix of 
pay should not find any systematic relationship between compensation and these 
mechanisms.
Asset pricing and informational efficiency arguments imply that known board 
structure, ownership and mix o f  pay do not affect future performance. The next section 
summarizes prior empirical studies, and evaluates them in light o f this section. Some 
studies appear in more than one category. Essentially all prior studies mix efficiency and 
opportunism arguments.
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3. Summary and Evaluation of Prior Empirical Literature
Many empirical studies investigate the effectiveness o f the various mechanisms 
firms use to resolve the agency problem between managers and shareholders. Early 
studies focus on examining the relationship between executive pay and firm performance, 
firm performance and management turnover, firm performance and corporate control. 
These studies are predicated on the assumption that governance failures lead to high 
levels o f compensation not related to firm performance, and to low rates o f management 
turnover following poor firm performance. Recent studies investigate the relationships o f 
mix of pay, compensation and firm performance with board structure and ownership. A 
brief summary follows.
3.1. Compensation and performance correlation studies
Early compensation-performance studies compare the correlation between 
executive compensation (salary, salary and bonus or total compensation) and 
performance (market or accounting based) with the correlation between executive 
compensation and some measure o f  firm size (such as sales, size o f the labor force,
etc.).^ These early studies find that the correlation between compensation and 
performance is not as high and/or as significant as the correlation of compensation to 
some measure o f size. For example, see Gordon (1962), Marris (1964), Williamson 
(1963), Baumol (1967), and Galbraith (1967). The results were interpreted as being
See Holmstrom (1979), Gejsdal (1981), Paul (1992), and Sloan (1993) for detailed discussion on the 
role of accounting numbers.
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supportive o f the claim that managers pursue goals other than shareholder value 
maximization.
There are two reasons for care in the interpretation of these findings. First, the 
size variables used in these studies may be proxying for the difficulty o f managing larger 
firms and the demand for higher quality managers by larger firms. If so, the positive 
association between size and compensation is consistent with efficient contracting 
instead of management entrenchment. Second, the results may be biased because o f 
correlated omitted variables that are discussed in the next subsection.
3.2. Compensation and performance regression studies
Later studies address potential correlated omitted variables problem in early pay 
performance studies by including other economic determinants of pay as regressors. 
These include growth opportunities, risk, characteristics o f the individual managers (e.g., 
age, tenure), size and performance measure(s) in a multi-variable single equation model. 
Contrary to the correlation type studies, these studies document a statistically significant
association between pay and performance.^ For example, see Lewellen and Huntsman 
(1970), Murphy (1985), Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Jensen and Murphy (1990), 
Main (1991), Sloan (1993), Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and Gaver (1993), Kaplan
(1994), and Baber, Janakiraman and Kang (1996).
7 There is some concern that the pay performance relation coefficient, though statistically significant, 
is not economically significant. Benston (1985) argues that though the performance sensitivity 
appears low relative to the wealth of shareholders, it is significant relative to the wealth of 
managers. It is the latter that matters for aligning the interest of managers with that of shareholders. 
Tevlin (1996), and Hadlock and Lumer (1997) suggest that model misspecification and research 
design problems may account for the low pay performance sensitivity reported in the literature.
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3.3. Compensation, performance, ownership structure and board structure
As discussed in section two, efficient contracting suggests that each firm chooses 
an optimal mix o f the different internal mechanisms, mix o f pay, ownership and board 
structures, conditional on the characteristics o f its underlying assets (IOS) and the 
relative costs and benefits o f the alternative mechanisms. Any known deviations from the 
optimal choice will be quickly reflected in price and hence cannot affect future 
performance. Competition in the labor market for managers and the market for corporate 
control also ensure that no firm systematically overcompensates its CEO, irrespective o f 
the ownership and board structures it chooses.
Empirical researchers investigate the effect o f ownership by CEOs, other officers 
and directors, and blockholders on compensation and performance. Their aim is to test 
the efficient contracting predictions that compensation and performance should be 
unrelated to ownership and board structures in a cross sectional regression.
The ownership variables used by most empirical research are: the ownership 
interests o f the CEO, other officers and directors (collectively known as insiders), 
ownership o f large external shareholders (blockholders, including or not including 
institutional owners). Different studies use different proxies to capture these constructs 
as we see below. Most studies use the composition o f the board (percentage outsider (or 
insider)), the CEO being chair o f the board, and board size to characterize the 
effectiveness o f the board. Recent studies have further subdivided outside directors into 
multitudes o f subgroups on the basis o f conjectures that are not driven by theory.
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3.3.1. Compensation, ownership structure and board structure
Some studies explore the relationship between ownership structure and executive 
compensation. They test the effect o f ownership by the CEO and blockholders on the 
level o f executive compensation. Allen (1981), Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt (1993) and 
Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) find a significant negative association between 
CEO compensation and CEO ownership while Cyert, Kang, Kumar and Shah (1997) find 
a significant positive association between compensation and CEO ownership. Cyert, 
Kang, Kumar and Shah (1997) also find that there is a negative relationship between 
CEO compensation and ownership of the largest shareholder (CEO or non-CEO).
Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt (1993) and Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) 
find a negative relation between CEO compensation and the presence o f an outside 
blockholder (and/or a non-CEO inside board member who owns 5% or more o f the 
shares). As opposed to Core et al. (1999), Cyert et al. (1997) find (a) no association 
between CEO compensation and the presence o f an insider with 5% or more ownership; 
and (b) a significant positive relationship between CEO compensation and the presence 
of an external blockholder. Core et al. (1999) report no statistically significant relation 
between CEO compensation and percentage ownership per outside director.
Other studies examine the relationship between executive compensation and 
board structure. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1988) find no association between executive 
compensation and the percentage of outside director on the board. Lambert, Larcker, 
and Weigelt (1993), Cyert, Kang, Kumar, and Shah (1997), and Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker (1999) report a positive association between executive compensation and the
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percentage of outside directors on the board. Core et al. (1999) also find a significant 
positive association between CEO compensation and the proportion o f “grey” directors
on the board.*
Cyert et al. (1997) and Core et al. (1999) interpret their findings as supportive o f 
the view that outside directors are hand-picked by the CEO. They argue that outsiders 
are less likely to take a position antagonistic to the CEO, especially when it comes to 
CEO compensation. It is not, however, clear how, or why, inside directors working 
under the CEO could be more independent than outside directors, since the same CEOs 
who hand-pick outside directors are likely to hand-pick the inside directors too.
Researchers often use separation of the posts o f CEO and chairperson o f the 
board (CHAIR) as another proxy for the monitoring effectiveness of the board o f 
directors. Some, for example, Cyert et al. (1997), and Core et al. (1999) conclude that 
agency problems are higher when the CEO also chairs the board because the CEO will 
have more bargaining power with the board. However, higher compensation to a CEO 
who also chairs the board is consistent with increased responsibility. The CEO is the 
most informed person about the firm and hence a natural candidate for the position o f 
chairperson o f the board. Having the CEO chair the board enhances the effectiveness o f 
the board by reducing conflicts. Given economic Darwinism, and that about 90% of my 
sample o f S&P 500 firms combine the two positions, supports this latter view.
A director is considered grey if he or his employer received payments from the company in excess of 
his board pay.
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Unlike empirical researchers that treat outside board members as a homogenous 
group, Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt (1993), and Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) 
divide outside directors into those appointed to the board before and after the CEO took 
office. Outside directors that joined the board after the CEO took office are assumed to 
be appointed by the CEO and hence less independent. These researchers find a positive 
association between CEO compensation and the percentage o f outside directors 
appointed to the board after the CEO took office. Hallock (1997) subdivides outside 
directors into interlocked (those in whose firms the CEO or any other officer of the firm 
serves as director) and non interlocked, and finds that firms with a higher proportion of 
interlocked outside directors pay higher compensation to their CEOs. Core et al. (1999) 
find a positive, but insignificant, relation between CEO compensation and the proportion 
of interlocked outside directors.
Defining outsiders who join the board after the CEO came into office as being 
appointed by the CEO is arbitrary. The shareholders (or at least the blockholders) may 
have exercised their rights in the appointment of these directors. Even board members 
appointed to the board by the CEO may not necessarily allow the CEO to entrench 
himself, as long as other mechanisms such as tying board members pay to firm 
performance, board members’ concern for their reputation, and the corporate control 
market are effective. Moreover, the proportion of outside directors appointed after the 
CEO came to office is likely to be highly correlated with CEO tenure. In a compensation 
equation that does not include CEO tenure as an explanatory variable, the proportions o f 
outside directors appointed after the CEO came into office may proxy for the effect o f
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CEO tenure on compensation. ^  Finally, though it is reasonable to argue that some 
outside board members (for example those hand picked by CEO, interlocked directors, 
etc.) are less independent than other outside directors, it is hard to explain why these
outside board members are less independent than inside board m em bers.^
Other empirical studies examine the effect o f board size on executive 
compensation. Larger boards may be better than small boards if they allow the firm to 
avail itself o f the services o f different experts. 11 Larger boards also have more people to 
monitor the CEO. In contrast, Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) argue that large 
boards are less effective than small boards due to the free rider problem, coordination 
problems, and large board’s higher susceptibility to manipulations by the CEO.
Yermack (1996) reports a strongly negative coefficient on an interaction term 
(abnormal return times board size) when it is included in a model for studying the pay- 
performance sensitivity o f CEO compensation. He interprets this evidence as supporting 
the conjecture that small boards give stronger compensation incentives to CEOs. Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker (1999) find a positive relation between executive compensation 
and board size, which they claim is consistent with ineffectiveness o f large boards. Cyert, 
Kang, Kumar and Shah (1997) find no association between compensation and board size
9 For example Cyert et al. (1997) find a positive association between CEO tenure and salary and 
bonus in their small firms sub sample.
10 Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) explain the positive coefficient on percentage of outside board 
members in the compensation regression by lack of independence of the board. They did not, 
however, explain why internal board members can be more independent.
11 It is unclear why the expert needs to be on die board; firms hire many experts who are not appointed 
to the board.
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using log (board size) as a scaled measure of board size. Cyert et al. (1997) suggest that 
correlation between sales as a measure of size and board size or log (board size) may 
have driven the Core et al. (1999) findings.
3.3.2. Performance, ownership structure and board structure
Using a sample o f 371 Fortune 500 firms, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) 
investigate the relationship between Tobin’s Q (as a measure o f firm performance) and 
ownership by the board of directors (insiders as well as outsiders) and control variables. 
The control variables used as proxies for investment opportunities are R&D, advertising 
and long term debt, each scaled by the replacement cost o f  assets. The replacement cost 
of assets is also used as a proxy for size. They find that: (a) Tobin’s Q increases with 
increases in board ownership at low (0 to 5%) and high (greater than 25%) levels of 
ownership; and (b) Tobin’s Q declines with increases in board ownership at intermediate 
(5% to 25%) levels o f ownership. Ownership by both inside and outside directors is used 
in lieu o f board ownership to test if the impact of the board’s ownership stake on market 
valuation is dependent on who owns that stake. They find that Tobin’s Q is related to 
both components o f board ownership in the same way that it is related to overall board 
ownership.
Using a sample o f 1173 firms for 1976 and 1093 firms for 1986 McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) examine the relationship between Tobin’s Q and ownership by corporate 
insiders (officers and members o f the board of directors), blockholders, and institutional 
investors and control variables. They use similar control variables to Morck et al. (1988), 
and find a strong curvilinear relationship (strongly positive at lower levels and weakly
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negative at higher levels) between Tobin’s Q and insider ownership. They also find a 
strong positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and institutional ownership. No 
significant relationship is found between Tobin’s Q and alternative specifications of
blockholder ownership. ^
Of the different ways o f mitigating the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders, the Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell et al. (1990) studies include only 
ownership variables in the performance equation. There are, however, some other 
complementary or substitute mechanisms (such as incentive-based compensation, 
monitoring by the board) that may help align the interests o f managers with those of 
shareholders. To the extent that the excluded variables are correlated with the variables 
included in the model, the results may be biased. Later studies by Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) and Mehran (1995) address this concern by including board characteristic 
variables in the performance equation.
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) report a positive (negative) association between 
firm performance and ownership by current and former CEOs still on the board at low
(high) levels of ownership. 13 They include board composition (the percentage of 
outsiders on the board), median ownership by inside and outside board members, an 
indicator variable if any two directors are related, CEO tenure, growth opportunities and
12 McConnell and Servaes (1990) used three alternative measures of blockholder ownership: 
ownership by the largest outside blockholder as reported by Value line; sum of the ownership of all 
large outside blockholders as reported by Value line; and an indicator variable equal to 1 if a 
blockholder (a 5% or more owner) exist, 0 otherwise.
13 Low level of ownership means less than 1% ownership in this study.
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firm size proxies as additional explanatory variables in the model. Yermack (1996) 
documents a positive association between firm performance and ownership by officers 
and directors. Mehran (199S) finds a positive association between firm performance and 
managerial ownership (alternatively defined as CEO ownership, ownership by the top 
five executives and ownership by all officers and directors) after controlling for growth,
risk, size, leverage, percentage of equity-based compensation and board composition. ^  
In a model that endogenizes ownership, Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1998) find no 
relationship between firm performance and CEO ownership.
Other studies investigate the relationship between firm performance and board 
structure. Using board composition (percentage o f outside directors on the board) as a 
proxy for the independence of the board from the CEO and association studies 
methodology, Baysinger and Butler (1985), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Mehran
(1995), Yermack (1996), and Bhagat and Black (1997), find no relationship between 
firm performance and the percentage of outsiders on the board. Agrawal and Knoeber
(1996) document a significant negative association between firm performance and the 
percentage of outside directors on the board in a study that explores the use o f seven 
different mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders in 
a simultaneous equations framework. Core et al. (1999) also report a negative 
association between future firm performance and percentage o f outside directors on the 
board.
14 The ownership variables used by Mehran (1995) include both shares and stock options owned by the 
CEO, the top five executive officers and all officers and directors.
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In an informationally efficient market, if increasing the number (or percentage) of 
outside directors is expected to lead to better performance, the effect should be reflected 
in price at the time o f the appointment o f the outside directors. If the effect is reflected in 
price at the time o f the event, it is not surprising that most o f the association studies find 
no relationship between subsequent performance and proxies for board independence. 
Rosenstein and Wyatt ( 1990) find a positive stock price reaction to the appointment of 
outside directors. Examining the relationship between CEO turnover and firm 
performance, Weisbach (1 9 8 8 ) reports that there is a stronger negative relationship 
between management turnover and performance in firms that have boards dominated by 
outsiders.
Rosenstein and Wyatt (19 90 ) and Weisbach (1 9 8 8 ) interpret their findings as 
consistent with the conjectures that: (a) Inside board members (board members who are 
current and former officers/employees of the firm), whose continued employment and 
careers are closely linked to the CEO, are less independent than outside board members; 
and (b) Board independence is valued by the market.
Yermack (1996) finds a significant negative association between firm 
performance and board size. Core et al. (1999) also report a negative association 
between future firm performance and what they call predicted excess compensation. 
Board size and CHAIR are two of the variables that they include in the determination o f 
excess compensation. This suggests that larger boards and CHAIR lead to poor future 
performance.
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3.4. Mix of pay, compensation and performance
Boards o f directors negotiate compensation contracts with CEOs. Compensation has 
two primary components: A fixed component, salary, and a variable component that 
changes with the level of firm performance (accounting or market based). The variable 
component is sensitive to firm performance and is generally meant to motivate managers 
to act in the interests o f shareholders.
Empirical researchers examine the relation between mix of pay and the IOS, mix 
of pay and the alternative mechanisms firms use to resolve the agency conflict with 
managers, compensation and mix of pay and performance and mix of pay. Each of these 
is discussed in turn.
The weight firms put on the variable component of compensation, mix o f pay, 
depends on the underlying characteristics o f the firm and the relative costs and benefits 
of other mechanisms (complements and/or substitutes) firms use to resolve the agency 
problem between managers and shareholders. Smith and Watts (1992), and Gaver and 
Gaver (1993) examine the relation between IOS variables and firm financial, dividend 
and compensation policies. They document that growth firms and large firms tend to use 
stock based and bonus based compensation more, while regulated firms tend to use them 
less. In a study that uses percentage o f equity based compensation as dependent variable, 
Mehran (199S) reports a positive relationship between the percentage o f equity based 
compensation and research intensity. Unlike Smith and Watts (1992), Mehran (1995) 
does not find any size effect. The leverage and risk variables are also found to have no 
effect in Mehran’s (1995) study.
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Examining the relations among the alternative incentive alignment mechanisms 
firms use, Mehran (1995) reports that firms with more outsiders on the board tend to put 
more weight on equity based compensation. He also documents a negative association 
between the percentage o f equity-based compensation and the percentage of shares held 
by inside or outside blockholders. Core et al. (1999) find a positive relation between the 
percentage o f non-salary compensation and board size, percentage of gray directors, 
percentage o f outside directors over age 69, percentage stock ownership per outside 
director. Core et al. (1999) also find a negative association between the percentage o f 
non-salary compensation and the percentage of inside directors, CEO percentage
ownership, the existence o f an inside or outside blockholder. I 5
The evidence on the relation between mix of pay and IOS is consistent with 
predictions of efficient contracting. Though, most o f prior research give opportunistic 
explanation to the relation between mix of pay and alternative mechanisms to resolve the 
agency conflict with managers, the evidence is also consistent with efficient contracting; 
alternative mechanisms are substitutes or complements to mix of pay.
Core et al. (1999) find a positive association between total compensation and mix 
of pay which they argue is indicative o f a governance failure; weak governance leading 
to high mix and high compensation. Smith and Watts (1992) document a strong positive
15 Kole (1995) examines the terms of ex ante compensation contracts (stock options, restricted stocks, 
etc.) and the characteristics of assets being managed. She finds evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that underlying firm characteristics play crucial roles in the determination of the terms 
of compensation contracts. Ittner, Larcker and Rajan (1997) investigate the factors that influence 
the relative weights placed on financial and non-financial performance measures in CEO bonus 
contracts.
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correlation between the level o f compensation and the use by firms o f stock (and bonus) 
based compensation.
Efficient contracting recognizes that increasing mix o f pay entails some cost. The 
variable component that is tied to firm performance shifts risk from well-diversified 
shareholders (usually characterized as risk neutral) to relatively less diversified managers 
(usually characterized as risk averse). This results in inefficient risk sharing relative to 
first best contracts that would impose all the risk on the well diversified shareholders. 
Firms have to pay a risk premium and hence higher expected compensation to the risk 
averse managers. Therefore, expected total compensation is higher when a firm puts 
more weight on the variable component of compensation.
Mehran (1995) investigates the relationship between two measures o f firm 
performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA) and the percentage o f equity-based compensation 
(the sum of grant value o f new stock options, phantom stock, restricted stock, and 
performance shares expressed as a percentage of total compensation. He finds a 
significant positive relationship between both performance measures and the percentage 
of equity-based compensation. Brickley, Bhagat and Lease (1985) find a positive 
abnormal return upon firms’ adopting stock-based compensation. These results are 
considered supportive o f the claim that mix of pay helps align the interests of mangers 
with those o f shareholders.
However, it is not evident that there should be a positive relationship between 
performance and mix o f pay in a cross sectional regression as long as one includes the 
different mechanisms firms use to resolve the agency conflict with managers. Efficient
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contracting suggests that different combinations of mechanisms are optimal for different 
firms.
3.5. Other related studies
Other studies examine the relationship between management turnover and firm 
performance (accounting or market based). These studies reason that, if the existing 
corporate governance mechanisms are effective in disciplining managers for actions or 
results that hurt shareholders, poor performance should be a predictor o f management 
turnover. Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Benston (1985), Warner, Watts and Wruck 
(1988) and Kaplan (1994) document that management turnover is negatively related to 
performance.
Shivdasani (1993) documents a negative association between the likelihood that a 
firm becomes a takeover target and board ownership. If reduced probability o f being a 
target stems from better performance, then increased ownership by board members helps 
strengthen the governance system of corporations. Shivdasani (1993) also explores 
whether a firm being a takeover target affects the reputations of directors, as reflected in 
the number o f additional directorships they hold. He documents that outside directors of 
targets in hostile takeovers hold fewer additional directorships. He interpret this as 
consistent with the assertion by Fama and Jensen (1983) that a board’s concern for 
reputation motivates it to closely monitor the CEO, and take actions consistent with the 
interests of shareholders.
Yermack (1996) examines the effect o f board size on management turnover 
following poor firm performance. In a Logit regression model that relates management
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turnover to cumulative abnormal return, an interaction term of abnormal return and 
board size, and other control variables, he finds a strongly positive coefficient on the 
interaction term which is consistent with the assertion that small boards are more 
effective in monitoring CEOs than are large boards.
Finally, Klein (1998) examines the relation between firm performance and the 
committee structure o f boards and the directors’ roles within these committees. He finds 
that: (a) There is a positive relation between performance (accounting and/or market 
based) and the percentage of inside directors on finance and investment committees; (b) 
Firms that increase the representation of inside directors on the finance and investment 
committees earn a significantly higher contemporaneous stock return and return on 
investment than firms that decrease the representation of inside directors in these 
committees. The results are interpreted to be consistent with the claim by Fama and 
Jensen (1983) that inside board members are better decision managers than outside 
board members.
3.6. Evaluation of compensation and performance studies
Taken together, the pay-performance and turnover performance studies imply 
that the different market, institutional and contractual mechanisms are effective in 
aligning the interests o f  managers with those o f shareholders.
A positive association between CEO compensation and firm performance 
suggests that CEOs are rewarded for creating wealth to shareholders. This evidence is 
inconsistent with the claims by managerial opportunism theory that CEOs enrich 
themselves at the expense o f shareholders. Higher compensation should not be construed
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as an indicator o f  a governance failure as long as it leads to higher wealth for 
shareholders. The goal is not to minimize compensation, but to maximize the wealth o f 
shareholders.
A negative association between management turnover and firm performance 
suggests that firms fire poorly performing CEOs. This contradicts managerial 
opportunism stories about CEO entrenchment, captive boards and powerless 
shareholders. This association is consistent with efficient contracting predictions that 
firms use optimal combinations of governance mechanisms to mitigate agency problems 
between managers and shareholders.
It is important to note that the evidence provided in the foregoing studies is on 
the overall effectiveness o f all contractual, institutional and market mechanisms without 
specific reference to one or other of the mechanisms. Recent studies question the 
optimality (effectiveness) o f some of the contractual, institutional and monitoring 
mechanisms that firms use in resolving the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders. These studies examine the relations among mix o f pay, compensation, firm 
performance, ownership and board structure.
Table 1 provides a summary of the foregoing analyses that abstracts from the 
particulars o f variable measurement; the emphasis is on concepts. There are three 
sources o f difficulty in table 1. Some results are inconsistent across studies. Others 
violate market efficiency, and some require an optimal governance structure that is the 
same for all firms. I discuss these in turn.
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First, some studies find different signs on the same variable. One example is 
different signs (negative, 0, positive) for the percentage o f outsiders on the board in the 
performance equation. Authors who find a negative sign interpret this as evidence that 
increasing the proportion o f outsiders on the board reflects poor governance leading to 
managerial entrenchment and poor performance. Authors who find a positive sign 
interpret this as evidence that increasing the proportion of outsiders on the board reflects 
good governance imposing discipline on CEOs, and improved performance.
Studies that find the same sign on a variable at times differ in interpretation. For 
example, the positive relationship between mix o f pay and percentage of outsiders on the 
board is interpreted as a sign of bad governance (managerial opportunism) by some and a 
result o f efficient contracting (substitution among governance mechanisms) by others. A 
board and ownership structure may be considered effective (good governance) by 
performance studies and ineffective (bad governance) by compensation studies. For 
example, compensation studies that find a positive sign on percentage of outside 
directors interpret their finding as evidence o f governance failure, while performance 
studies that find a positive sign on the same variable interpret their finding as suggestive 
of good governance. Higher percentage o f outsiders in the board is good and bad at the 
same time: CEOs are selectively opportunistic.
Second, claims that certain ownership and board structures systematically lead to 
overcompensation and poor stock performance are inconsistent with market efficiency. 
In an informationally efficient market, differences in observable firm characteristics such 
as the structure o f  ownership cannot lead to differences in firm performance, as any
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Table 1: Characterization and Interpretation of Prior Empirical Literature
Variables Mix of Pay Compensation Performance Management
Turnover
Ownership Structure
CEO ownership - -»+ o,+ -
Inside ownership - - ,o +
Outside blockholders + 0,+
Board Structure
Percentage of outsiders + 0,+ 0,+ +
CEO chairs board o,+ o, + -
Board size + 0,+ - -
Mix of Pay + +
Interpretation: Mix of pay equation. Some prior studies interpret positive coefficients 
on ownership and board variables as evidence o f governance failure, and hence 
opportunism. Others interpret positive coefficients as evidence of efficient contracting; 
there is substitution among internal governance mechanisms.
Interpretation: Compensation equation. Positive coefficients on ownership and board 
variables are interpreted as evidence o f a governance failure leading to excess 
compensation. Some interpret the positive sign on mix o f pay as an indicator of 
opportunism while others offer an efficient contracting explanation; more performance 
related pay requires a higher risk premium.
Interpretation: Performance equation. Positive coefficients on ownership, board and 
mix of pay variables are interpreted as evidence of good governance.
Interpretation: Management turnover after poor performance. Positive coefficients 
on ownership and board variables are interpreted as evidence of good governance; firms 
that have good governance are likely to fire CEOs that perform poorly.
effects these differences have on future performance should be reflected in today’s price. 
Further, competition in the internal and external labor market for managers and the 
presence o f active corporate control markets ensures that CEOs are not persistently 
overcompensated.
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Third, implicit in many interpretations is the assumption that there is a unique 
optimal ownership and board structure for all firms. Yet, in practice, firms use different 
mixes o f the internal control mechanisms and have done so since the inception o f modem 
corporations. It is hard to justify the persistence o f inefficient governance mechanisms 
over long time periods and across many firms in otherwise competitive and efficient 
markets.
A “good” theory would reconcile the mixed findings and be consistent with 
market efficiency. Typically, prior compensation and performance studies ignore mix of 
pay and those that include mix o f pay do not take its endogeneity into account. There is 
a correlated omitted variable and endogeneity problem. I address both these problems by 
investigating simultaneously the different substitute and complementary mechanisms 
firms use to resolve the agency problem between managers and shareholders. These 
mechanisms include incentive contracts, monitoring by blockholders, and monitoring by 
the board. The next section extends the theory o f section two to measurement of 
variables and provides descriptive statistics.
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4. Sample Selection, Measurement and Descriptive Statistics
This section describes the sample selection procedure, discusses variables and 
their measurement, presents the empirical model and the testable hypotheses, and 
provides descriptive statistics on selected variables. One objective o f this study is to 
reconcile and integrate prior studies in the area, so measuring variables in similar ways to 
prior studies is essential; the following definitions reflect this. However, some variables 
from prior studies are not used because they are ad hoc in nature and it is not clear what 
they are capturing.
4.1. Data and sample selection
The data sources for the variables used in the paper are: ExecuComp for 
compensation and CEO ownership; Compact Disclosure for the board and ownership 
characteristic variables; and CRSP and COMPUSTAT for the financial variables.
The sample for this study is the S&P 500 firms that have CEO compensation 
information on the Standard & Poors’ ExecuComp data base for the year 1993. Lagged 
values are required for some variables. The year 1993 is used because it is the first year 
after SEC electronic filing of proxy statements and disaggregation of compensation 
became requirements that provides access to lagged variables.
Table 2A summarizes the information on the sample selection procedure. There 
are 462 firms with compensation data on ExecuComp. I exclude 185 firms, financial 
firms and firms that have a non 12/31 fiscal year ends. Of the remaining 277 firms, 35 
lack board and ownership data on Compact Disclosure. Another 47 firms are lost due to
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missing values in the CRSP and Compustat data bases. The final sample consists o f  19S 
firms.
Table 2B reports the industry breakdown in the sample and comparative numbers 
from the 1993 population of Compustat firms. The population comparisons exclude the 
same groups as the sample, finance, insurance, real estate (6000-6999) and government 
(9000-9999). The sample over-represents manufacturing and utility firms and under­
represents service firms relative to the population. However, this is characteristic o f the 
S&P 500.
4.2. Variables and measurement
This section discusses measurement issues. The endogenous and predetermined 
variables are discussed separately.
4.2.1. Endogenous variables
Mix o f pay captures the component o f incentive compensation in total 
compensation. It is measured as percentage o f performance related incentive 
compensation (bonus, stock options, restricted stock, long term incentive pay, and other 
compensation) in total compensation, as in Core et al. (1999)
Mix of pay = [(Total compensation - Salary)/Total compensation] for the year 1993.
Ideally, one would use an ex ante measure o f mix o f pay. However, the ex ante 
measure o f mix o f pay cannot be determined on the basis o f any data. Contracts are 
deliberately vague to allow compensation committees discretion to account for all 
circumstances.
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Table 2A: Sample Selection Procedure
Initial Sample: S&P 500 firms on the ExecuComp database 462
Less: Financial firms (SIC 6000 to 6999) and firms that do not (185)
have a 12/31 fiscal period
277
Less: Firms with Missing ownership and board o f directors (35)
variables on Compact Disclosure
242
Less: Firms with missing data on COMPUSTAT and CRSP tapes (47)
Sample used in the study 195
Table 2B: Industry Composition
SIC Codes Industry Number
of
Sample
Firms
Cumulative
Sample
Percentage
Cumulative
Population
Percentage*
0001-0999 Agriculture, forestry, fishing 0.7
1000-1499 Extraction 11 5.6 8.9
1500-1799 Construction 1 6.2 10.6
2000-3999 Manufacturing 129 72.3 60.5
4000-4999 Transportation & utilities 34 89.7 70.0
5000-5999 Wholesale and retail trade 10 94.9 84.1
7000-8999 Services 10 100.0 100.0
* Population o f 1993 Compustat firms excluding finance, insurance, real estate
(6000-6999) and government (9000-9999).
Even if firms base their choice o f mix on some targeted level o f performance, the 
target is not observable. As in prior studies, the mix o f pay measure used is an ex post 
measure. Therefore, it has a mechanical relationship with concurrent performance that 
might lead to a spurious correlation between the two variables. This issue is not
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addressed by prior studies. In this paper the problem o f spurious correlation is 
significantly mitigated, since mix o f pay is endogenously determined within the system.
Compensation is total compensation. It includes salary, bonus, stock options, 
restricted stock, long term incentive pay, and other compensation for 1993. These 
variables are reported in the ExecuComp data base. Salary is the fixed portion of 
compensation, which is known at the beginning of the period. Bonus is often related to 
accounting performance and is the amount granted during the year. Stock options and 
restricted stock values are the Black/Scholes values at the time of the grant. Long term 
incentive pay is measured by the payout during the year.
Performance is measured using market return. It is the continuously compounded 
annual return for 1993.
4.2.2. Predetermined variables
Like most prior studies, size (SIZE), growth options (GROWTH) and volatility 
of returns (VOL) are the investment opportunity set (IOS) variables used in this study. ^  
Size is measured using sales. Growth options are measured by market value of equity 
plus book value of debt divided by book value o f assets. Volatility is measured by 
standard deviation of monthly returns over the 60 months prior to 1993.
Leverage, ROA, market beta, CEOOLD and a regulation dummy are also used. 
Leverage (LR) is measured by the ratio of long term debt to total assets. ROA is an
16 Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and Gaver (1993), Mehran (1995) used size, growth and risk 
variables in their mix of pay equations.
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accounting performance measure and equals earnings before interest and taxes divided 
by total assets.
Market beta is the single factor CAPM beta calculated using 60 monthly returns 
prior to 1993. The variable used in this study (BETA) is market beta multiplied by the 
market return for 1993. If market beta instead of the product term is used, there is 
uncertainty about the sign of the coefficient. A negative coefficient could result from a 
negative market return and a positive coefficient or a positive market return and a 
negative coefficient. Since market return for 1993 is a cross sectional constant, using the 
product instead of market beta only changes the coefficient estimate and standard error 
for this particular variable. The t-statistic and the p-value will not change.
When a CEO approaches retirement, he faces an horizon problem. CEOOLD 
captures this effect. It is an indicator variable that is unity when the CEO is 64 years or 
older. The regulation dummy (REG) is unity when a firm is a utility (i.e., two digit 
SIC=49).
The ownership and board variables I use are those commonly used by most prior 
studies and directly relate to the theory in section two. Using variables that cut across 
many studies is essential, since the objective o f this study is to reconcile and integrate 
prior studies in the area.
Some variables used in prior studies are ignored because they are ad hoc in nature 
and it is not clear what they capture. For example, consider the variable ‘busy’ outside 
directors used by Core et al. (1999). An outside director is considered busy if he is a 
member o f  3 (6 if retired) or more other boards. If the idea is to capture the amount o f
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time the board member can spend on his board duties, one must consider all factors that 
demand the time o f the board member. It could be that those who are members o f less 
than 3 boards are the busiest and that is why they are members o f few boards.
CEO ownership and the existence o f internal and external blockholders are the
ownership variables used. ^  These variables reflect the incentive alignment effect that 
the ownership interests o f the major players (CEO, non-CEO insiders and blockholders) 
may have. They also capture the relative bargaining power o f each participant, and hence 
the relative influence of each person on decisions made within the firm.
CEO ownership (CEOOWN) is measured by the percentage o f ownership o f the 
CEO. INSOWN is an indicator variable that equals one when a non-CEO insider owns 
5% or more o f the outstanding shares. OUTBLOCK is an indicator variable that equals 
one when an outsider (including institutions) owns 5% or more of the outstanding 
shares.
CHAIR, board size (BDSIZE), and percentage o f inside directors (BDINSIDE) 
are the board structure variables. Chair is set to unity when the CEO also chairs the 
board. BDSIZE is measured by the number o f directors on the board. BDINSIDE is 
defined as the percentage o f inside directors on the board.
Using the aggregate officer and director statistics is recommended by Anderson and Lee (1997) in 
an article entitled Field Guide for Research Using Ownership data.
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4.3. Empirical model
Combining the theoretical model in section two with measurement o f the
variables provides the following empirical model, which is used to test the hypotheses in
the paper.
MIX = P, o + PijSIZE + p, ..GROWTH + Pu VOL + p, 4LR + p, jCEOOLD +
P, 6CHAIR + p, 7BDSIZE + p, gBDINSIDE + p, 9CEOOWN + pU0INSOWN + (4.1)
p, nOUTBLOCK + e,
COMP = p2 0 + p2 ,SIZE + p2 .GROWTH + P2.3VOL + P2 4 LR + p2 5ROA92 +
p26CHAIR + p27 BDSIZE + p2 gBDINSIDE + P29CEOOWN + p 210INSOWN + (4.2) 
p2 ,,OUTBLOCK + <j>2 ,MIX + <j)23PERF + e 2
PERF = p3 0 + P3.,SIZE + P3 2GROWTH + p3JVOL + P34BETA +
p36CHAIR + p 3 7BDSIZE + p3gBDINSIDE + p 39CEOOWN + p 3,0INSOWN + (4.3)
P3, ,OUTBLOCK + <f>3, MIX + e 3
Where:
MIX = Percentage o f  incentive compensation in total CEO compensation.
That is, (total compensation minus salary) divided by total 
compensation.
COMP = Total CEO Compensation. It includes salary and bonus, stock
options, performance units, performance shares and stock 
appreciation rights.
PERF = Market return for 1993 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly
returns).
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SIZE
GROWTH
VOL
LR
ROA
ROA92
PERF92
BETA
CEOOLD
REG
CHAIR
BDSIZE
BDINSIDE
CEOOWN
Sales for the year 1992.
Growth options for 1992 defined as (Market value o f equity + book 
value o f debt)/book value o f assets.
Standard deviation (in percentages) o f monthly returns (measure of 
firm risk).
Leverage measure defined as (long term debt/total assets) for 1992. 
ROA for the year 1993 (in percentages)
ROA for the year 1992 (in percentages)
Market return for 1992 (continuously compounded from 12 monthly 
returns).
(Market beta from a one factor CAPM model calculated using 60 
monthly returns prior to 1993) multiplied by market return for 1993.
An indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 64 years or older.
An indicator variable that equals I when the firm is a regulated utility.
An indicator variable which equals 1 when the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board and 0, otherwise.
Number o f directors.
Percentage of inside directors on the board.
Percentage ownership of CEO.
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INSOWN = An indicator variable set to 1, when there is a non-CEO insider with 
ownership o f 5% or more or 0, otherwise.
OUTBLOCK = An indicator variable set to 1, when there is an outsider (including 
Institutional owners) with ownership o f 5% or more or 0, otherwise.
4.4. Sign predictions
Predictions reflect the efficiency theory in section two extended to measured 
variables. Some additional analysis is provided for the mix of pay equation, but detailed 
predictions for compensation and performance follow directly from section two. Only 
discussion not already in section two is included here.
4.4.1. Mix of pay equation (4.1)
Monitoring difficulty increases with firm size, growth and volatility, so mix of 
pay increases with these variables. However, increased volatility requires compensation 
for bearing that risk and leads to increased salary, thereby decreasing mix o f  pay. With 
opposing positive and negative effects o f  volatility on mix, the net effect o f volatility on 
mix is an empirical matter.
As the CEO approaches retirement, the horizon problem increases and dismissal 
as a motivating device is ineffective. This suggests increasing incentive compensation 
(particularly, long term incentive pay) as retirement approaches. CEOOLD is predicted 
to have a positive effect on mix.
Appointing the CEO chairperson of the board leads to two effects on mix o f pay, 
one positive and the other negative. If  the CEO becomes chair to exploit increased
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knowledge, salary increases and mix declines. However, the resulting increase in decision 
rights increases monitoring difficulty, and hence increases mix.
If inside directors have incentives to maximize value, and are more informed about 
the firms circumstances and the CEOs’ actions than are outside directors, then the 
insiders’ direct monitoring is a substitute for increased mix. This implies a negative 
relation between mix and BDINSIDE.
Direct ownership by the CEO reduces the need for performance related 
compensation. Blockholders, both inside and outside, have incentives to acquire 
knowledge about the firm’s environment and the actions o f the CEO. Therefore, 
ownership by the CEO and other large holders are substitutes for increased mix o f pay. I 
predict that CEOOWN, INSOWN, AND OUTBLOCK are negatively related to mix. A 
summary of the predictions and explanations is presented below.
Variable Prediction Explanation
SIZE + Monitoring difficulty
GROWTH + Monitoring difficulty
VOLATILITY 7 Monitoring difficulty (+), compensation for risk (-)
LEVERAGE - Joint minimization o f manager, stockholder, bondholder
conflicts
CEOOLD + Horizon
CHAIR ? Increased salary (•), relax decision rights (+)
BDSIZE ? Prior studies, possible substitution effect (•)
(summary continued)
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Variable Prediction Explanation
BDINSIDE - Substitution effect
CEOOWN - Substitution effect
INSOWN - Substitution effect
OUTBLOCK - Substitution effect
4.4.2. Compensation equation (4.2)
The following summary follows from section two. Efficiency argum ents imply 
that, after controlling for IOS, mix o f  pay and performance, board structu re  and 
ownership should have no effect on com pensation.
Variable Prediction Explanation
SIZE + Demand for higher quality management
GROWTH + Demand for higher quality management
VOLATILITY + Compensation for risk
ROA92 + Pay for performance
CHAIR 0 Efficiency
BDSIZE 0 Efficiency
BDINSIDE 0 Efficiency
CEOOWN 0 Efficiency
INSOWN 0 Efficiency
OUTBLOCK 0 Efficiency
(sum m ary continued)
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Variable Prediction Explanation
MIX + Compensation for risk
PERF + Pay for performance
4.4.3. Performance equation (4.3)
The following sum m ary follows from section two. T he essence o f  the argum ent is 
that, if board and ow nership structures are known, only determ inants o f  expected returns 
can affect future perform ance.
Variable Prediction Explanation
SIZE - Fama/French
GROWTH - Fama/French
VOLATILITY 0 Efficiency, asset pricing
BETA + Asset pricing
CHAIR 0 Efficiency
BDSIZE 0 Efficiency
BDINSIDE 0 Efficiency
CEOOWN 0 Efficiency
INSOWN 0 Efficiency
OUTBLOCK 0 Efficiency
MIX 0 Efficiency
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4.5. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for selected variables. Most o f the 
results are similar to those reported by others. They are self descriptive, and hence I only 
discuss results worth emphasizing. First, compensation is right skewed and has high 
variability across firms. For example, total compensation ($000s) ranges from a minimum 
of 311.79 to 21,273. Incentive pay accounts for 66% (median) and 62% (mean) o f 
compensation to the average CEO in S&P 500 firms. Option grant value is the largest 
component o f CEO performance related compensation in firms in this sample.
Second, about 90% of the firms in the sample have a CEO who also chairs the 
board. About 78% of the average board's members are outside directors. Both numbers 
are slightly higher than numbers reported in other studies including Cyert et al. (1997) 
and Core et al. (1999). Given economic Darwinism, such wide spread practices suggest 
efficiency explanations. Third, CEO percentage ownership is very low; the mean is 
0.75% and the median is 0.11%. This is similar to results in prior studies o f large
firms.
For example see Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Core et al. (1999).
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
N=I95
Endogenous Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Mix of Pay (MIX) 62.26 66.24 18.06 0.23 96.46
Compensation (000s)
Salary 734.18 700.0 274.21 275 2507.69
Bonus 557.83 427.09 544.86 0 4000
Long-term incentive pay 234.15 0 903.94 0 11306.25
Restricted stock 174.09 0 483.98 0 4239.43
Option grant value 847.72 427.2 1596.9 0 14488.60
Total compensation (COMP) 2787.41 2051.74 2830.65 311.79 21273.61
Performance, 1993 (PERF) 
Predetermined Variables
17.63 13.94 24.61 -42.54 116.96
Investment Opportunity Set (IOS)
SIZE ($M) 8918.08 3824.45 16713.60 181.80 130590
GROWTH 1.76 1.39 1.05 0.88 10.12
VOL 7.54 7.15 2.35 3.64 21.03
Other
LR (%) 21.85 22.49 11.96 0 58.42
ROA 10.22 8.78 8.0 -2.09 79.97
ROA92 9.69 8.46 8.4 -12.69 74.30
PERF92 15.54 11.25 27.1 -39.99 179.67
BETA* (using CRSP value weighted 
index)
12.07 12.57 4.99 -2.25 26.38
CEOOLD 0.07 0 0.26 0 I
REG 0.11 0 0.32 0 I
Board characteristics
CHAIR 0.9 1 0.3 0 1
BDSIZE 12.37 12 2.67 6 20
BDINSIDE 22.2 20 11.69 6.25 90
Ownership
CEOOWN (%) 0.75 0.11 2.75 0 24.57
INSOWN 0.11 0 0.31 0 1
OUTBLOCK 0.77 1 0.42 0 1
* BETA is the product o f estimated betas and CRSP 1993 value weighted market 
return. The CRSP 1993 value weighted market return is 11.49.
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(table 3 continued)
MIX = Percentage o f  incentive compensation in total CEO compensation. That is, (total compensation
minus salary) divided by total compensation.
COMP = Total CEO Compensation. It includes salary and bonus, stock options, performance units.
performance shares and stock appreciation rights.
PERF = Market return for 1993 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
SIZE = Sales for the year 1992.
GROWTH = Growth options for 1992 defined as (Market value of equity + book value of debtybook value of
assets.
VOL = Standard deviation (in percentages) of monthly returns (measure of firm risk).
LR = Leverage measure defined as (long term debt/total assets) for 1992.
ROA = ROA for the year 1993 (in percentages)
ROA92 = ROA for the year 1992 (in percentages)
PERF92 = Market return for 1992 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
BETA = (Market beta from a one factor CAPM model calculated using 60 monthly returns prior to 1993)
multiplied by market return for 1993.
CEOOLD = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 64 years or older.
REG = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the linn is a regulated utility.
CHAIR = An indicator variable which equals 1 when the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0,
otherwise.
BDSIZE = Number o f directors.
BDINSIDE = Percentage o f inside directors on the board.
CEOOWN = Percentage ownership of CEO.
INSOWN = An indicator variable set to 1, when there is a non-CEO insider with Ownership of 5% or more
or 0, otherwise.
OUTBLOCK = An indicator variable set to 1, when there is an outsider (including Institutional owners) with
Ownership o f 5% or more or 0, otherwise.
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5. Primary Results: Ordinary and two stage least squares
This section presents the primary results. These encompass ordinary least squares
and two stage least squares using the variables defined in section four. Section six 
provides sensitivity analyses including using logs of some variables. Prior studies use 
both raw and log specifications. The estimation on the raw variables seems more intuitive 
and probably more consistent with the way people think about compensation. There are, 
however, reasons for using a log specification. It mitigates the effect o f outliers through 
scaling the data and it has an easy elasticity interpretation. I investigate the effect of 
using log-compensation and log-sales in section 6. Use of the regulation dummy is also 
included in the sensitivity section.
5.1. Model and estimation procedures
I use a three equation simultaneous system. The three equations in the system 
are: mix o f pay, compensation and performance. The analysis is done in four steps. First, 
I run OLS regressions for each o f the equations, without including mix o f pay on the 
right hand side. This establishes the base case. Second, I include mix o f pay as an 
explanatory variable in the compensation and performance equations. I then compare the 
results from this model with those from the base model to evaluate the impact of 
addressing the correlated omitted variable problem without addressing endogeneity. 
Third, I conduct the Hausman test for endogeneity, and show that MIX is endogenous. 
Finally, I estimate the systems of equations using two stages least squares (2SLS). I 
compare the results from this model with those from the first two models to assess the 
effect o f tackling both the correlated omitted variable and endogeneity problems.
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2SLS is used to estimate the systems of equations because it has good small 
sample properties; see Intriligator (1996). First, it is a consistent estimator. Second, 
Monte Carlo studies find that, relative to 3SLS, FIML and other estimation techniques, it 
has the lowest mean square error most o f the time. Third, it is not affected much by 
misspecification and measurement errors.
5.2. Ordinary least squares with raw variables
This subsection uses OLS on the three equations, both with and without the 
endogenous mix of pay. Only raw variables are used Table 4 summarizes the OLS 
results using raw variables. The results on the left are for the regressions that do not 
include mix o f pay as an explanatory variable while the results on the right include mix of 
pay.
5.2.1. Mix of pay
The mix of pay equation is well specified. The White statistic does not reject the 
joint hypothesis that the equation is well specified and homoscedastic. Adjusted R2 is 
0.13, with an F probability o f 0.0001. Mix of pay is significantly positively related to 
sales implying that larger firms tend to use more incentive based compensation. This is 
similar to findings by Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and Gaver (1993), Cyert et al. 
(1997) and Core et al. (1999).
The highly significant negative coefficient on leverage is consistent with the 
hypothesis about monitoring by lenders and the role compensation contracts play in 
resolving the agency problem between shareholders and debtholders. See John and John
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Table 4: Ordinary Least Squares Using Raw Variables
N=195
E(Signs)*
OLS Without Mix of Pay OLS With Mix of Pay
MIX COMP PERF MIX COMP PERF
Financial
INTERCEPT ?,?,?.?,?,? 57.83 215,542 35.37 57.83 - 18.97
4,528,796
(0.0001) (0.8943) (0.0078) (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.1606)
SIZE 0.00014 35.46 0.00025 0.00014 20.99 0.00019
(0.0376) (0.0026) (0.9933) (0.0376) (0.0190) (0.9742)
GROWTH 1.38 148,565 -5.51 1.38 -271,219 -6.51
(0.1587) (0.3417) (0.0005) (0.1587) (0.8228) (0.0001)
VOL ?,+,0,?,+,0 -0.20 -5,752 4.19 -0.20 65,323 4.37
(0.7182) (0.5236) (0.0001) (0.7182) (0.1998) (0.0001)
LR -0.35 -0.35
(0.0012) (0.0012)
ROA92 -  + +,~ 1,321 14,200
(0.4884) (0.3473)
PERF92 ~ + ~ ~ 23,546 9,649
(0 .0021) (0.0724)
BETA -1.70 -1.79
(0.9999) (0.9999)
CEOOLD 9.91 9.91
(0.0267) (0.0267)
Board
CHAIR ?,0 .0,?.0.0 5.32 226,107 -4.41 5.32 -216,432 -5.71
(0.2042) (0.7366) (0.4197) (0.2042) (0.6867) (0.2818)
BDSIZE ?,0 ,0,?,0,0 0.23 122,142 -1.64 0.23 90,333 -1.69
(0.6333) (0.1310) (0.0116) (0.6333) (0.1606) (0.0075)
BDINSIDE -,0,0.-,0.0 -0.059 -5,754 0.135 -0.059 -754 0.145
(0.2926) (0.7429) (0.3401) (0.2926) (0.9569) (0.2904)
Ownership
CEOOWN -.0,0,-,0,0 - 1.66 -54,270 0.586 - 1.66 80,297 1.093
(0.0006) (0.4758) (0.3432) (0.0006) (0.1956) (0.0758)
INSOWN -.0,0,-,0,0 4.28 1,070,601 1.56 4.28 691,369 -0.094
(0.8588) (0.0996) (0.7645) (0.8588) (0.1818) (0.9851)
OUTBLOCK -,0,0,-0,0 4.84 -3,527 -0.72 4.84 -320,765 -2.157
(0.9424) (0.9944) (0.8570) (0.9424) (0.4219) (0.5808)
MIX 96,922 0.334
(0.0000) (0.0002)
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.08 0.20 0.13 0.42 0.25
P(F) 0.0001 0.0069 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
P(White) 0.5720 0.8194 0.4307 0.5720 0.0487 0.0477
P(Hausman: MIX) 0.0001 0.0002
PCHausman: PERF) 0.3085
* The ? and ~ in predicted signs represent no prediction and the variable is not in the 
model. The reported numbers are coefficient estimates and probabilities. Probabilities 
are one-tail when the prediction is directional and two-tail otherwise.
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(table 4 continued)
MIX = Percentage of incentive compensation in total CEO compensation. That is, (total compensation
minus salary) divided by total compensation.
COMP = Total CEO Compensation. It includes salary and bonus, stock options, performance units.
performance shares and stock appreciation rights.
PERF = Market return for 1993 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
SIZE = Sales for the year 1992.
GROWTH = Growth options for 1992 defined as (Market value o f equity + book value o f debtybook value of
assets.
VOL = Standard deviation (in percentages) of monthly returns (measure of firm risk).
LR = Leverage measure defined as (long term debt/total assets) for 1992.
ROA = ROA for the year 1993 (in percentages)
ROA92 = ROA for the year 1992 (in percentages)
PERF92 = Market return for 1992 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
BETA = (Market beta from a one factor CAPM model calculated using 60 monthly returns prior to 1993
) multiplied by market return for 1993.
CEOOLD = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 64 years or older.
REG = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the firm is a regulated utility.
CHAIR = An indicator variable which equals 1 when the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0,
otherwise.
BDSIZE = Number o f  directors.
BDINSIDE Percentage of inside directors on the board.
CEOOWN = Percentage ownership of CEO.
INSOWN = An indicator variable set to 1, when there is a non-CEO insider with Ownership of 5% or more
or 0, otherwise.
OUTBLOCK = An indicator variable set to 1, when there is an outsider (including Institutional owners) with
Ownership of 5% or more or 0, otherwise.
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(1993) and John and Senbet (1998). The dummy variable CEOOLD is significantly 
positive. This accords with the assertions by Jensen and Murphy (1990) about the 
horizon problem that arises as the CEO approaches retirement. The threat o f dismissal 
becomes less effective as a motivational device, so firms increase use o f other incentive 
devices.
The CHAIR variable is insignificant. Mix o f pay is negatively related to CEO 
ownership, suggesting that CEO ownership and use o f incentive contracts are substitute 
mechanisms to align the interests of the CEO with those of shareholders. This is 
consistent with findings by Mehran (1995), and Core et al. (1999). None o f the other 
board and ownership variables are significant. Overall mix o f pay is significantly related 
to size, leverage, the CEOs proximity to retirement and CEO ownership.
5.2.2. Compensation
The model without mix o f pay is well specified, and the F statistic is significant. 
The White statistic does not reject the joint hypothesis that the model is well specified 
and homoscedastic. Consistent with findings by Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and 
Gaver (1993), Cyert et al. (1997) and Core et al. (1999), I find a strong positive 
relationship between compensation and size. Because larger firms require higher quality 
CEOs with high marginal productivity, they pay higher compensation. Compensation is 
also positively related to performance This finding is similar to results in Murphy 
(1985), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Cyert et al. (1997), and Core et al. (1999) among 
others.
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The board and ownership variables, except for INSOWN and BDSIZE, are all 
insignificant. The marginal significance of INSOWN and BDSIZE are inconsistent with 
the predictions of efficient contracting. Broadly, the result is consistent with efficiency 
arguments that governance mechanisms are optimally chosen by firms. Caution, 
however, is in order in drawing strong conclusions from these findings as there is a yet to 
be addressed correlated omitted variable and endogeneity problem.
Comparing the compensation regression with and without MIX as a regressor, 
the significance of SIZE, PERF92, INSOWN and BDSIZE declines somewhat. The 
decline in the significance of INSOWN and BDSIZE is a move in the direction o f 
efficient contracting predictions. MIX is significantly positively related to compensation. 
There are no changes o f consequence to other coefficients. R2 increases substantially 
from 0.08 to 0.42. However, the White test rejects the joint hypothesis that the model is 
well specified and homoscedastic and the Hausman test rejects the hypothesis that MIX 
is predetermined. These two specification tests are consistent with the efficiency 
arguments in section two that MIX is an omitted endogenous variable.
5.2.3. Performance
Superficially, some of the results in the performance equation are puzzling. SIZE, 
GROWTH, VOL, BETA and BDSIZE are significantly related to performance. The sign 
o f the coefficient on BETA is inconsistent with Sharpe/Lintner/Black style asset pricing 
models. Ignoring asset pricing issues, the other significant coefficients are inconsistent 
with semi-strong form informational efficiency. However, we cannot ignore asset pricing 
issues. Fama and French (1992) find that variables such as size, growth, and earnings
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price ratio are related to mean returns over large samples and many time periods. The 
anomalous findings above are consistent with these broader deficiencies in current asset 
pricing models. Until such issues are resolved in finance, asset pricing and efficiency 
issues are inextricably intertwined. None of the other board and ownership variables is 
significant when MIX is excluded.
The parameter estimates in the foregoing performance equation are, however, 
biased and inconsistent if there is a correlated omitted variable and/or endogeneity 
problem. Mix o f pay is one variable that theory suggests should be included in the 
performance equation. I investigate the effect of adding mix of pay next.
Focusing on the performance equation including MIX, there are few changes of 
note. The coefficient on CEO ownership becomes marginally significant and MIX is 
highly significant. As in the compensation equation, the White and Hausman tests reject 
the specification; MIX is endogenous. In the two stage least squares estimation in the 
next subsection, MIX becomes insignificant. Accounting for asset pricing anomalies, the 
results from the performance equation are broadly consistent with efficiency, although 
the BDSIZE result is a puzzle.
5.3. Two stage least squares using raw variables
The mix o f pay equation is identical to that using OLS. Overall, the results for 
compensation and performance are similar to the OLS results discussed above.
The White and Hausman tests accompanying the OLS results in section 5.2 
establish that MIX is endogenous. Results from estimating the model as a system using
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2SLS are presented in Table 5. Estimation of a simultaneous system requires that the 
system is identified. Identification restrictions raise the issue o f whether exclusion of 
predetermined variables from equations is correct (or reasonable). The identifying 
restrictions are driven by the efficiency theory; Basmann’s (1960) test does not reject the 
overidentifying restrictions.19 The results from 2SLS are similar to those from OLS 
(including mix) above. In the compensation equation, the coefficient on MIX declines 
somewhat, but is still significant. The coefficient on volatility has the predicted positive 
sign and is marginally significant. Though the significance o f INSOWN increases a bit, it 
is still less significant than it was in the OLS model that excludes mix of pay. BDSIZE 
becomes even more insignificant in the compensation equation when endogeneity is 
addressed.
In contrast to compensation, the use of 2SLS has important effects on the 
performance equation. Significant coefficients on governance variables in prior studies 
probably stem from failure to properly include the endogenous mix o f pay. Using 2SLS, 
CEOOWN and MIX are no longer significant. Addressing endogeneity is crucial. 
However, the asset pricing difficulties remain as does the puzzling significant coefficient 
on BDSIZE.
19 The null hypothesis in Basmann’s (1960) test is that the predetermined variables not appearing in 
any equation have zero coefficients.
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Table 5: Two Stage Least Squares Using Raw Variables
N=195
E(Signs)*
2SLS With Raw Variables
MIX COMP PERF
Financial
INTERCEPT ?,?.? 57.83 -3,341,641 29.56
(0.0001) (0.1912) (0.1643)
SIZE 0.00014 27.084 0.0002
(0.033) (0.0278) (0.9766)
GROWTH 1.38 -249,114 -5.87
(0.1587) (0.7830) (0.0012)
VOL ?,+,0 -0.20 98,458 4.25
(0.7182) (0.1361) (0.0001)
LR -0.35
0.0012
ROA92 ~ ,+ ,~ 20,509
(0.3341)
BETA -1.73
(0.9999)
CEOOLD + ~ ~ 9.91
(0.0267)
Board
CHAIR 7.0.0 5.32 -130,807 -4.87
(0.2042) (0.8236) (0.3786)
BDSIZE 7.0.0 0.23 80,517 -1.66
(0.6333) (0.3121) (0.0097)
BDINSIDE -.0,0 -0.059 -153.39 0.139
(0.2926) (0.9918) (0.3205)
Ownership
CEOOWN -.0.0 -1.66 36,335 0.76
(0.0006) (0.6518) (0.3382)
INSOWN -.0.0 4.28 885,218 0.97
(0.8588) (0.1211) (0.8566)
OUTBLOCK -.0.0 4.84 -125,287 -1.23
(0.9424) (0.7761) (0.7698)
MIX ~.+,0 71,843 0.12
(0.0207) (0.7294)
PERF ~ .+ ,~ 649.21
(0.4915)
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.09 0.20
P(F) 0.0001 0.0025 0.0001
P(Over-identified) 0.4325 0.6482 0.2212
* The ? and ~ in predicted signs represent no prediction and the variable is not in the 
model. The reported numbers are coefficient estimates and probabilities. Probabilities 
are one-tail when the prediction is directional and two-tail otherwise.
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(table 5 continued)
MIX = Percentage of incentive compensation in total CEO compensation. That is, (total compensation
minus salary) divided by total compensation.
COMP = Total CEO Compensation. It includes salary and bonus, stock options, performance units.
performance shares and stock appreciation rights.
PERF = Market return for 1993 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
SIZE = Sales for the year 1992.
GROWTH = Growth options for 1992 defined as (Market value of equity + book value of debtybook value of
assets.
VOL = Standard deviation (in percentages) o f monthly returns (measure o f firm risk).
LR = Leverage measure defined as (long term debt/total assets) for 1992.
ROA = ROA for the year 1993 (in percentages)
ROA92 = ROA for the year 1992 (in percentages)
PERF92 = Market return for 1992 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
BETA = (Market beta from a one factor CAPM model calculated using 60 monthly returns prior to 1993
) multiplied by market return for 1993.
CEOOLD = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 64 years or older.
REG = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the firm is a regulated utility.
CHAIR = An indicator variable which equals 1 when the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0,
otherwise.
BDSIZE = Number of directors.
BDINSIDE = Percentage of inside directors on the board.
CEOOWN = Percentage ownership of CEO.
INSOWN = An indicator variable set to 1, when there is a non-CEO insider with Ownership of 5% or more
or 0, otherwise.
OUTBLOCK = An indicator variuble set to 1, when there is an outsider (including Institutional owners) with
Ownership of 5% or more or 0, otherwise.
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6. Sensitivity Analysis
For purposes o f  comparability with prior research and testing the robustness of 
results, several sensitivity analyses are reported.
6.1. Ordinary and two stage least squares with log variables
Results from OLS and 2SLS estimation using logs o f  compensation and size are 
in Tables 6 and 7. The overall flavor o f the findings is similar to those with the raw 
variables discussed in section five. Signs and significance o f coefficients, the results of 
specification and endogeneity tests, and the use of 2SLS generate conclusions that are 
unchanged from section five. Few changes o f note are: GROW becomes more significant 
in the mix of pay equation; VOL is highly significant in the compensation equation (and 
has the predicted sign) and ROA92 becomes marginally significant (and has the predicted 
sign) in the performance equation.
6.2. Ordinary and two stage least squares with a regulation dummy
Tables eight and nine replicate the primary results in tables four and five 
respectively with the addition o f a dummy variable for regulated utilities. The coefficient 
on the regulation dummy is only significant in compensation regressions when there is no 
control for mix o f pay. That is, when the variable the theory predicts is relevant is 
omitted, one finds a spurious significant negative coefficient on the regulation dummy. 
The coefficient on REG is significantly negative in the mix of pay equation. This is 
consistent with restrictions imposed by regulation causing managers o f regulated firms to
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have fewer decision rights; see Smith and Watts (1992) and Christie, Joye and Watts 
(1999). Other unreported results show that no other industry dummies matter.
6.3. Variable definitions and proxies
A variety o f  variations on variable measures are investigated. The variations used 
include: (1) An alternative measure o f incentive compensation that includes only stock 
based and long-term components o f compensation in the numerator; (2) book value of 
assets instead o f  sales as a measure o f size; (3) log o f BDSIZE. The results from these 
variations are not reported in detail, since they do not change the tenor o f the 
conclusions.
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Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares Using Log Variables
N=195
E(Signs)*
OLS Without Mix of Pay OLS With Mix of Pay
MIX COMP PERF MIX COMP PERF
Financial
INTERCEPT ?.?.?,?,?,? 25.44 11.65 16.35 25.44 11.14 11.85
(0.0708) (0.0001) (0.3735) (0.0708) (0.0001) (0.5054)
SIZE 4.16 0.28 2.56 4.16 0.15 0.88
(0.0003) (0.0000) (0.9372) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.7014)
GROWTH 2.10 0.12 -5.43 2.10 -0.05 -6.72
(0.0626) (0.0845) (0.0007) (0.0626) (0.8488) (0.0000)
VOL ?,+,0,?,+,0 0.09 0.016 4.46 0.09 0.027 4.37
(0.8683) (0.2379) (0.0001) (0.8683) (0.0188) (0.0001)
LR -0.31 -0.31
(0.0037) (0.0037)
ROA92 0.001 0.008
(0.4524) (0.0754)
PERF92 0.0047 0.0009
(0.0064) (0.1983)
BETA + , ~  ~  + -1.84 -1.82
0.9999 0.9999
CEOOLD + ,~ ,  ~ + , ~  ~ 10.55 10.55
(0.0175) (0.0175)
Board
CHAIR ?.0,0,?.0,0 4.41 0.20 -5.03 4.41 0.08 -6.22
(0.2809) (0.1908) (0.3620) (0.2809) (0.3513) (0.2450)
BDSIZE ?,0.0,?.0,0 -0.16 -0.003 -1.66 -0.16 -0.0003 -1.56
(0.7436) (0.8854) (0.0150) (0.7436) (0.9812) (0.0188)
BDINSIDE - , 0 , 0 , - . 0 , 0 -0.06 -0.002 0.155 -0.06 -0.00003 0.166
(0.2773) (0.6863) (0.2799) (0.2773) (0.9891) (0.2289)
Ownership
CEOOWN - , 0 , 0 , - . 0 , 0 -1.59 -0.024 0.60 -1.59 0.014 1.07
(0.0007) (0.1587) (0.3375) (0.0007) (0.1587) (0.0837)
INSOWN -,0,0,-,0,0 4.81 0.19 1.16 4.81 0.049 -0.71
(0.8916) (0.2013) (0.8255) (0.8916) (0.5724) (0.8893)
OUTBLOCK -,0,0,-,0,0 4.91 0.035 -1.07 4.91 -0.06 -2.65
(0.9493) (0.7525) (0.7921) (0.9493) (0.3415) (0.5013)
MIX ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ , + , o 0.030 0.35
(0.0000) (0.0003)
Adjusted R* 0.17 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.74 0.23
P(F) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
P(White) 0.7648 0.6305 0.3352 0.7648 0.8145 0.0668
P(Ha us man: MIX) 0.0001 0.0002
P(Hausman: PERF) 0.1734
* The ? and ~ in predicted signs represent no prediction and the variable is not in the 
model. The reported numbers are coefficient estimates and probabilities. Probabilities 
are one-tail when the prediction is directional and two-tail otherwise.
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(table 6 continued)
MIX Percentage of incentive compensation in total CEO compensation. That is, (total compensation
minus salary) divided by total compensation.
COMP = Total CEO Compensation. It includes salary and bonus, stock options, performance units.
performance shares and stock appreciation rights.
PERF = Market return for 1993 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
SIZE = Sales for the year 1992.
GROWTH = Growth options for 1992 defined as (Market value of equity + book value of debtybook value of
assets.
VOL = Standard deviation (in percentages) of monthly returns (measure of firm risk).
LR = Leverage measure defmed as (long term debt/total assets) for 1992.
ROA = ROA for the year 1993 (in percentages)
ROA92 = ROA for the year 1992 (in percentages)
PERF92 = Market return for 1992 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
BETA = (Market beta from a one factor CAPM model calculated using 60 monthly returns prior to 1993
) multiplied by market return for 1993.
CEOOLD = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 64 years or older.
REG = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the linn is a regulated utility.
CHAIR = An indicator variable which equals 1 when the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0,
otherwise.
BDSIZE = Number of directors.
BDINSIDE = Percentage of inside directors on the board.
CEOOWN = Percentage ownership of CEO.
INSOWN = An indicator variable set to 1, when there is a non-CEO insider with Ownership of 5% or more
or 0, otherwise.
OUTBLOCK = An indicator variable set to 1, when there is an outsider (including Institutional owners) with
Ownership of 5% or more or 0, otherwise.
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Table 7: Two Stage Least Squares Using Log Variables
N=195
E(Signs)*
2SLS With Log Variables
MIX COMP PERF
Financial
INTERCEPT ?,?,? 25.44 11.17 13.61
(0.0708) (0.0001) (0.4613)
SIZE 4.16 0.185 1.54
(0.0003) (0.0000) (0.7398)
GROWTH 2.10 -0.025 -6.22
(0.0626) (0.6649) (0.0019)
VOL ?,+.o 0.09 0.031 4.411
(0.8683) (0.0195) (0.0001)
LR -,~,~ -0.31
(0.0037)
ROA92 ~,+,~ 0.009
(0.1364)
BETA -1.82
(0.9999)
CEOOLD 10.55
(0.0175)
Board
CHAIR ?.0,0 4.41 0.108 -5.76
(0.2809) (0.2846) (0.2965)
BDSIZE ?.o,o -0.16 -0.0027 -1.60
(0.7436) (0.8374) (0.0179)
BDINSIDE -.0,0 -0.062 -0.00024 0.162
(0.2773) (0.9250) (0.2467)
Ownership
CEOOWN -.0.0 -1.59 0.0051 0.8920
(0.0007) (0.7134) (0.2586)
INSOWN -.0,0 4.81 0.09 0.02
(0.8916) (0.3545) (0.9971)
OUTBLOCK -.0,0 4.91 -0.0252 -2.0345
(0.9493) (0.7432) (0.6347)
MIX ~,+,o 0.024 0.2130
(0.0002) (0.5624)
PERF 0.00082
(0.4337)
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.46 0.19
P(F) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
P(Over-identified) 0.5875 0.7252 0.1685
* The ? and ~  in predicted signs represent no prediction and the variable is not in the 
model. The reported numbers are coefficient estimates and probabilities. Probabilities 
are one-tail when the prediction is directional and two-tail otherwise.
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(table 7 continued)
MIX = Percentage o f  incentive compensation in total CEO compensation. That is, (total compensation
minus salary) divided by total compensation.
COMP = Total CEO Compensation. It includes salary and bonus, stock options, performance units.
performance shares and stock appreciation rights.
PERF = Market return for 1993 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
SIZE = Sales for the year 1992.
GROWTH = Growth options for 1992 defined as (Market value of equity + book value o f debtybook value of
assets.
VOL = Standard deviation (in percentages) of monthly returns (measure o f firm risk).
LR = Leverage measure defined as (long term debt/total assets) for 1992.
ROA = ROA for the year 1993 (in percentages)
ROA92 = ROA for the year 1992 (in percentages)
PERF92 = Market return for 1992 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
BETA = (Market beta from a one factor CAPM model calculated using 60 monthly returns prior to 1993
) multiplied by market return for 1993.
CEOOLD = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 64 years or older.
REG = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the firm is a regulated utility.
CHAIR = An indicator variable which equals 1 when the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0,
otherwise.
BDSIZE = Number o f directors.
BDINSIDE = Percentage o f inside directors on the board.
CEOOWN = Percentage ownership of CEO.
INSOWN = An indicator variable set to 1, when there is a non-CEO insider with Ownership of 5% or more
or 0, otherwise.
OUTBLOCK = An indicator variable set to 1, when there is an outsider (including Institutional owners) with
Ownership o f  5% or more or 0, otherwise.
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Table 8: Ordinary Least Squares Using Raw Variables with Regulation Dummy
N=195
E(Signs)*
OLS Without Mix of Pay OLS With Mix of Pay
MIX COMP PERF MIX COMP PERF
Financial
INTERCEPT ?,?,?,?,?,? 68.78 1,620,134 40.65 68.78 -4,959,038 18.95
(0.0001) (0.3427) (0.0041) (0.0001) (0.0014) (0.2055)
SIZE 0.00008 27.97 0.00023 0.00008 22.38 0.00019
(0.1576) (0.0147) (0.9845) (0.1576) (0.0154) (0.9718)
GROWTH 0.43 -61,301 -6.02 0.43 -232,630 -6.51
(0.3740) (0.5658) (0.0003) (0.3740) (0.7814) (0.0000)
VOL ?,+,0,?,+,0 -1.03 -97,367 4.02 -1.03 87,959 4.37
(0.0784) (0.8272) (0.0001) (0.0784) (0.1516) (0.0001)
LR -0.25 -0.25
(0.0140) (0.0140)
ROA92 10,784 12,323
(0.4053) (0.3673)
PERF92 ~ +,~ ~,+ ~ 25,559 8.871.80
(0.0009) (0.0939)
BETA ~ ~ + ~ ~  + -1.82 -1.79
(0.9999) (0.9999)
CEOOLD 8.37 8.37
(0.0457) (0.0457)
REG -16.63 -1.705,406 -6.58 -16.63 391.243 0.02
(0.0001) (0.0088) (0.2710) (0.0001) (0.2618) (0.9974)
Board
CHAIR ?,0.0,?,0,0 4.65 189,816 -4.40 4.65 •218,181 -5.7149
(0.2509) (0.7749) (0.4204) (0.2509) (0.6848) (0.2832)
BDSIZE ?.0.0.?,0.0 0.219 125,641 -1.64 0.219 88,806 -1.69
(0.6469) (0.1157) (0.0116) (0.6469) (0.1688) (0.0076)
BDINSIDE -,0,0.-,0,0 -0.065 -7,441.36 0.130 -0.065 -253.43 0.14
(0.2671) (0.6678) (0.3598) (0.2671) (0.9856) (0.2921)
Ownership
CEOOWN -,0.0,-.0.0 -1.65 -52,932 0.59 -1.65 83,054 1.093582
(0.0004) (0.4812) (0.3332) (0.0004) (0.1825) (0.0770)
INSOWN -,0,0,-,0,0 3.73 964,455 1.25 3.73 707,087 -0.094001
(0.8336) (0.1336) (0.8099) (0.8336) (0.1733) (0.9852)
OUTBLOCK -.0,0, -.0,0 2.71 -224,273 -1.45 2.71 -277,345 -2.155549
(0.8157) (0.6553) (0.7205) (0.8157) (0.4942) (0.5859)
MIX 99,128 0.33
(0.0000) (0.0006)
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.10 0.20 0.19 0.41 0.24
P(F) 0.0001 0.0016 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
P(White) 0.8191 0.9999 0.2883 0.8191 0.2645 0.0547
P( Ha usman: MIX) 0.0001 0.0003
PfHausman: PERF) 0.3138
* The ? and ~ in predicted signs represent no prediction and the variable is not in the 
model. The reported numbers are coefficient estimates and probabilities. Probabilities are 
one-tail when the prediction is directional and two-tail otherwise.
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(table 8 continued)
MIX = Percentage of incentive compensation in total CEO compensation. That is, (total compensation
minus salary) divided by total compensation.
COMP = Total CEO Compensation. It includes salary and bonus, stock options, performance units.
performance shares and stock appreciation rights.
PERF = Market return for 1993 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
SIZE = Sales for the year 1992.
GROWTH = Growth options for 1992 defined as (Market value of equity + book value of debtybook value of
assets.
VOL = Standard deviation (in percentages) of monthly returns (measure of firm risk).
LR = Leverage measure defined as (long term debt/total assets) for 1992.
ROA = ROA for the year 1993 (in percentages)
ROA92 = ROA for the year 1992 (in percentages)
PERF92 = Market return for 1992 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
BETA = (Market beta from a one factor CAPM model calculated using 60 monthly returns prior to 1993
) multiplied by market return for 1993.
CEOOLD = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 64 years or older.
REG = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the linn is a regulated utility.
CHAIR = An indicator variable which equals 1 when the CEO is also the chairman o f the board and 0,
otherwise.
BDSiZE = Number of directors.
BDINSIDE = Percentage of inside directors on the board.
CEOOWN = Percentage ownership of CEO.
INSOWN = An indicator variable set to I, when there is a non-CEO insider with Ownership o f 5% or more
or 0, otherwise.
OUTBLOCK = An indicator variable set to 1, when there is an outsider (including Institutional owners) with
Ownership of 5% or more or 0, otherwise.
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Table 9: Two Stage Least Squares Using Raw Variables with Regulation Dummy
N=195
E(Signs)*
2SLS With Raw Variables
MIX COMP PERF
Financial
INTERCEPT ?,?,? 68.7813 -3434127 51.3520
(0.0001) (0.3415) (0.1602)
SIZE 0.00007 26.4301 0.0002
(0.1576) (0.0207) (0.9784)
GROWTH 0.4359 -258728 -5 7811
(0.374) (0.7997) (0.0015)
VOL ?,+,0 -1.039 95360 3.85359
(0.0784) (0.1989) (0.0008)
LR - ~,~ -0.2554
(0.014)
ROA92 ~,+ 21869
(0.3235)
BETA -1.8389
(0.9999)
CEOOLD +,~.~ 8.3780
(0.0457)
REG -16.639 -31564 -9.8444
(0.0001) (0.4891) (0.4096)
Board
CHAIR 7.0.0 4.6506 -132217 -3.7621
(0.2509) (0.8282) (0.5332)
BDSIZE 7.0,0 0.2190 82009 -1.6254
(0.6469) (0.3034) (0.0172)
BDINSIDE -.0.0 -0.0653 -295.2674 0.1227
(0.2671) (0.9845) (0.4130)
Ownership
CEOOWN -.0.0 -1.6599 38360 0.3540
(0.0004) (0.6974) (0.7227)
INSOWN -.0.0 3.7331 872069 1.9197
(0.8336) (0.1261) (0.7413)
OUTBLOCK -.0.0 2.7135 -132574 -1.1116
(0.8157) (0.7624) (0.7993)
MIX -.+,0 73463 -0.1651
(0.0732) (0.7489)
PERF ~,+,o 1763.8799
(0.4761)
Adjusted R2 0.1878 0.1070 0.1776
P(F) 0.0001 0.0012 0.0001
P(Over-identified) 0.9977 0.6376 0.348 3
* The ? and ~ in predicted signs represent no prediction and the variable is not in the 
model. The reported numbers are coefficient estimates and probabilities. Probabilities 
are one-tail when the prediction is directional and two-tail otherwise.
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(table 9 continued)
MIX = Percentage of incentive compensation in total CEO compensation. That is, (total compensation
minus salary) divided by total compensation.
COMP = Total CEO Compensation. It includes salary and bonus, stock options, performance units.
performance shares and stock appreciation rights.
PERF = Market return for 1993 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
SIZE = Sales for the year 1992.
GROWTH = Growth options for 1992 defined as (Market value of equity + book value of debtybook value of
assets.
VOL = Standard deviation (in percentages) of monthly returns (measure o f  firm risk).
LR = Leverage measure defined as (long term debt/total assets) for 1992.
ROA = ROA for the year 1993 (in percentages)
ROA92 = ROA for the year 1992 (in percentages)
PERF92 = Market return for 1992 (Continuously compounded from 12 monthly returns).
BETA = (Market beta from a one factor CAPM model calculated using 60 monthly returns prior to 1993
) multiplied by market return for 1993.
CEOOLD = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the CEO is 64 years or older.
REG = An indicator variable that equals 1 when the firm is a regulated utility.
CHAIR = An indicator variable which equals 1 when the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0,
otherwise.
BDSIZE = Number of directors.
BDINSIDE = Percentage of inside directors on the board.
CEOOWN = Percentage ownership of CEO.
INSOWN = An indicator variable set to 1, when there is a non-CEO insider with Ownership of 5% or more
or 0, otherwise.
OUTBLOCK = An indicator variable set to 1, when there is an outsider (including Institutional owners) with
Ownership of 5% or more or 0, otherwise.
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7. Summary and Conclusions
This paper integrates and extends prior studies on compensation, performance 
and mix o f pay. Both theory and evidence are enhanced. There are two views of agency 
relations that are not mutually exclusive. The first is that managers behave 
opportunistically because there are no effective mechanisms to constrain their behavior. 
The second is that competitive pressures induce managers to maximize the value of the 
firm. This view reflects economic Darwinism; economic survival requires discovering 
efficient ways to manage the firm. This approach is known as efficient contracting and 
assumes that managers, shareholders, the board of directors and bondholders have 
incentives to equate marginal costs and marginal benefits.
Theories based on efficient contracting imply strong testable restrictions on 
agency relations associated with the firm. Theories based on opportunism are less 
restrictive, since there are myriad ways that opportunism can occur. While these two 
views of the firm are not mutually exclusive, it is useful to think of them as extremes.
The theory in section two incorporates the agency relation o f stockholders with 
debtholders into the analysis, and develops implications o f efficient contracting that have 
been largely ignored in empirical work. An important implication o f efficient contracting 
is that all agency relations, ownership, and governance mechanisms within the firm 
should be treated jointly. First, those implications are used in section three to show that 
some prior results are mutually contradictory and inconsistent with efficiency. Second, 
the study jointly estimates relations among mix of pay, executive compensation, 
performance, ownership, and board structure using a simultaneous equations
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methodology. Table 10 provides a succinct summary o f  predictions and results on 
ownership, board structure and mix of pay.
The results support the implication o f efficient contracting that it is necessary to 
approach agency relations simultaneously. When this is done, the results are broadly
consistent with the restrictions implied by efficient contracting. ^ 0 The only exception is 
related to board size. None o f the other board and ownership variables is significant, 
consistent with the prediction that in an efficient market firms choose optimal 
combinations o f available governance mechanisms.
Important detailed contributions are:
1. The relation between stockholders and debtholders affects the relation between
managers and stockholders. Financial leverage has a significant effect on mix of 
pay.
2. Mix of pay is an omitted variable in many prior studies. Evidence is provided that
mix of pay is also endogenous.
3. The direct effect of regulation on compensation reported in prior studies is
spurious. The evidence provided shows that this effect is caused by omitting mix 
o f pay from the compensation equation.
2® There are some other anomalous results, but these are not peculiar to agency studies, and are 
consistent with known failures of simple asset pricing models.
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Table 10: Predictions from Efficient Contracting and Results Using Two Stage
Least Squares
Variables Mix of Pay Compensation Performance
E(Sign) Result E(Sign) Result E(Sign) Result
Ownership Structure
CEO ownership - - 0 0 0 0
Inside ownership - 0 0 0 0 0
Outside blockholders - + 0 0 0 0
Board Structure
Percentage of insiders - 0 0 0 0 0
CEO chairs board ? 0 0 0 0 0
Board size ? 0 0 0 0 -
Mix of Pay + + 0 0
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